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Drug-War Psychology
I read with keen interest Raul 
Barrios M oron’s article, “Bolivia: 
The Psychology of Drug W ar”
(Hemisphere, Fall 1991). He indi­
cates that at least one side of the 
“drug war” is implementing an im­
portant part of low-in tensity con­
flict doctrine—psychological 
warfare. I am careful to say one 
side because I suspect that the 
“other side” is also using tech­
niques that could be defined as 
psychological warfare tactics. In­
deed, using Barrios M oron’s own 
definition of psychological warfare, 
his article would constitute a psy­
chological warfare operation, an at­
tem pt to win the hearts and minds 
of the readers by m anipulation of 
the information.
Barrios M oron’s m anipulation 
of the information is obviously 
slanted against the Bolivian mili­
tary’s involvement in the drug war. 
This is not, however, a condem na­
tion of the au thor’s view. Given 
Bolivia’s authoritarian history, a 
concern for the continuation of Bo­
livian democracy against the back­
drop of increased militarization is 
certainly valid.
O f even greater concern, 
though, is the ossification of view­
points into two distinct camps. This 
is precisely what the author is accus­
ing the Bolivian military of doing, 
creating an either you’re “for us” 
or “against us” attitude by m anipu­
lating information. He shows his 
bias by his contradictory statements 
concerning who is responsible for 
the military’s antidrug role, his fail­
ure to include the plethora of mili­
tary literature that cautions against 
the exclusive use of the military in 
such a role, and by not following 
through with a suggested alterna­
tive course of action even after 
identifying an institutional weak­
ness that he cites as a contributing 
cause of the militarization.
Low-intensity 
warfare—the category 
under which drug 
operations are 
included— is not a 
“Western ” doctrine.
It can be seen in the 
writings of Mao 
Tse-tung (Protracted 
War, Guerilla War) 
and Che Guevara 
(Guerrilla Warfare).
Barrios Moron states that the 
poster “conveys an unequivocal un­
derstanding of the military’s self- 
appointed role.” Self-appointed?
On page 14 he cites the US gov­
ernm ent’s financial support and 
technical backing for the Bolivian 
army’s psychological warfare opera­
tions. On page 16 he alludes to the 
US role in the militarization effort: 
“the poster asserts the Bolivian—as 
opposed to US—origins of the anti­
drug campaign,” and refers to the 
“strategic impositions of the US 
drug war.” In addition, on page 15, 
he cites the signing of the US- 
Bolivian bilateral drug agreement, 
“under which President Jaime Paz 
Zamora agreed to order the Boliv­
ian army into the war on drugs.” 
How could Barrios Moron argue
that the military is “appointing” 
itself when he writes in the same 
article that they were ordered into 
the “war” by their democratically 
elected leader, who is heavily influ­
enced by the US.
The author also believes the 
poster warns “that Bolivia’s current 
rural developm ent program, De- 
sarrollo Altemativo, seems to have be­
come a m ere com plem ent for an 
incipient campaign of low-intensify 
warfare.” A m ere complement? Or 
a m atter of perspective? A plethora 
of literature in the military/low- 
intensity conflict field strongly ar­
gues for alternative development 
programs as part of the overall 
strategy and strongly cautions 
against using the military instru­
m ent as the sole instrum ent to ad­
dress insurgencies—the category 
under which drug operations are 
included.
This is not a “W estern” doctrine. 
It can be seen in the writings of 
Mao Tse-tung (Protracted War, 
Guerilla War) and Che Guevara 
(Guerrilla Warfare), even though it 
is not specifically labeled “psycho­
logical warfare.” Some of the most 
prolific writers urging that social 
development be made the major 
thrust in counterinsurgency opera­
tions are members of the military.
There is far too m uch literature 
in the field to review here, but a re­
cent article by US Army Captain 
Michael Ligon, a special forces- 
qualified military intelligence offi­
cer, addresses this professional 
concern. He cites US Army Field 
Manual 100-20, Military Operations 
in Low-intensity Conflict, which iden­
tifies the integrated approach of 
political, economic, and military 
operations necessary for counterin­
surgency and counternarcotics op­
erations to be successful. Captain
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Ligon expresses the concern that 
this coordinated approach, while 
current in the US, is no t being 
addressed in the overseas coun­
ternarcotics strategy. “The weak 
link lies in not having an economic 
alternative to offer drug producing 
nations. . . .  In the war on drugs, a 
purely military approach is not the 
answer” (“LIC, Counternarcotics 
and Small-Scale Agriculture,” Spe­
cial Warfare: The Professional Bulletin 
of the fohn F. Kennedy Special Warfare 
Center and School, W inter 1991).
Captain Ligon offers a two­
pronged economic strategy to ad­
dress this problem. The first is a 
program  of the Benson Institute 
for Small-Scale Agriculture that al­
locates a certain am ount of land to 
crops that provide a well-balanced 
diet while still raising the farm er’s 
average annual income. Captain 
Ligon states that this program  has 
already proved to be successful in 
Ecuador. The second strategy is 
based on a program  of the Founda­
tion for the Prom otion and Devel­
opm ent of M icroenterprise that 
distributes low-interest loans to 
market vendors in the “informal 
sector” of La Paz, Bolivia.
Finally, Barrios Moron states 
that “contributing to the military’s 
renewed sense of mission and in­
dispensability has been the institu­
tional breakdown of the police, 
caused by widespread drug-related 
corruption.” Despite his identifica­
tion of the role the police are play­
ing in the changing role of the 
military, no where does Barrios 
M oron call for the reconstitution 
o f the police force. He is not alone 
in this. There appears to be a great 
deal of research on the military 
and num erous calls for a reduction 
in the military’s role in civil affairs, 
but little research and support for
the institution that is the most 
likely to replace the vacuum left 
should the military return  to a 
purely external defense role: the 
police.
In reality it is drug trafficking 
that is the threat to Bolivian na­
tional security and the consolida­
tion of their democracy. It is drug 
trafficking that the people have 
turned  to because of their extreme 
poverty and it is drug trafficking 
that has resulted in the US “strate­
gic impositions.” It now appears 
that the psychological warfare oper­
ations of both sides have been a 
success. There is no serious talk of 
economic and agricultural pro­
grams, nor talks to address what 
institution has the strength to en­
force any democratically enacted 
law should the military leave the in­
ternal security arena. Failure to 
com prehend the desperation felt 
by both sides in this escalating 
“war,” as well as the resultant lack 
of negotiations, are the real threats 
to Bolivian democracy.
Sgt. Cliff Nelson 
Metro-Dade Police D epartm ent
Miami, Florida
Editor’s Note: The opinions expressed 
are those of the author alone, and not 
necessarily those of the Metro-Dade 
Police Department.
Regarding Sovereignty
Irving Louis Horowitz’s “Shadow 
of a N ation” (Hemisphere, W inter/ 
Spring 1992) provides an excellent 
analysis of why Panama is an excep­
tional and atypical Latin American 
nation. Indeed, in many respects, it 
is an artificial nation. But when he 
ventures into policy recom m enda­
tions that follow from his charac­
terizations, he falls into all sorts of 
perceptual traps. That the Reagan 
and Bush administrations followed 
the same logic makes it no less re­
grettable.
The Carter-Torrijos treaties at 
least held out the promise that the 
bitterness and enmity of US-Pana- 
m anian relations could be ended, 
that the US would withdraw grad­
ually from Panama, and that the 
long-sought Panam anian control 
over the canal would be achieved. 
Although the withdrawal has been 
a reluctant process, and its spirit 
violently devastated by the US inva­
sion of 1989, at least the timetable 
has been observed. Horowitz's view 
of US vital interests—which he did 
recognize m ight be “real or pre­
sum ed”—calls into question the 
whole strategic concept on which 
the treaties were based. And his ar­
guments that certain Panamanian 
postures cannot be tolerated by the 
US are the thinnest kind of ration-
Hemisphere welcomes letters to the editor. Letters must be typed double-spaced, and 
are subject to editing for clarity and length.
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Letters to the Editor
alization for whatever blatant viola­
tions of Panamanian sovereignty 
this country might carry out. H oro­
witz is saying, in effect, we really 
d idn’t mean it when we signed 
those treaties. Too bad, but we’re 
big and you’re small.
We did take Panama, as Teddy 
Roosevelt liked to boast. But surely 
that sort of power politics in US- 
Latin American relations has out­
lived its usefulness. Violent and 
extraordinarily destructive inva­
sions of sovereign states, like the 
1989 invasion of Panama, coupled 
with the forcible kidnapping of a 
head of state—legitimate or not— 
set dangerous precedents that will 
haunt us in the future. To hold 
that US law applies anywhere and 
that we will enforce it anywhere is 
an outrageous extension of sover­
eignty, the very sovereignty that 
Horowitz wants to deny to small 
countries like Panama.
Horowitz appears to base much 
of his argum ent on the strategic 
necessity of the Panama Canal—a 
waterway whose strategic and eco­
nomic value has steadily declined— 
and extends the logic to the right 
of the US to fix the neutrality of 
Panama. That logic, perfectly con­
sistent with the Reagan-Bush view 
of the world, is a perverse justifica­
tion for an endless series of mis­
chievous follies and police-like 
interventions around the continent 
and the globe. If Panama is indeed 
a “shadow of a nation,” m uch of 
the blame for that lies on the US. 
For most of Panam a’s history as an 
“independent” state, it has been 
caught in the shadow of the US,
subjected to the worst sort of sub­
jugation, split down its middle by a 
zone where foreign law ruled, and 
corrupted by constant interference 
in its politics by US proconsuls. 
That the country became a “politi­
cal shadow without state substance” 
should be no surprise. Even a rea­
sonable chance at enduring politi­
cal development was precluded by 
the relationship between the two 
countries.
“In a world of strategic consid­
erations,” Horowitz argues, “those 
of sovereignty are at times pre­
em pted.” Indeed, they are, and 
therein lies the tragedy o f recent 
US foreign policy. That policy has 
been characterized by a sort of poli­
tics of the bully, in which the US 
flexes its muscle and applies its 
military power only in safe situa­
tions. Grenada, Panama, Nicara­
gua, and Iraq are the most recent 
examples. Doing so does not legiti­
mate it, and the disregard of na­
tional sovereignty in favor of a 
blatant hegemonic role for this 
country is a two-edged sword. A 
nation, superpower or not, that ig­
nores long-standing principles of 
international law, the Rio treaty, 
and the UN Charter, simply cannot 
have it both ways. When we disre­
gard sovereignty, we weaken the 
very foundation of orderly inter­
national relations. We cannot ar­
gue for world order at the same 
time we are ignoring world institu­
tions like the International Court 
of Justice (as in the Nicaraguan 
case).
I fear that Horowitz’s logic is 
only a thinly veiled and weakly ar­
gued rationalization and apology 
for foreign policies that insult 
o ther states, weaken respect for 
international law, and do a great 
disservice to any hopes that the US 
might stand for something noble 
in the world. The people of Pana­
ma, and the rest of Latin America, 
deserve better.
Jack W. Hopkins 
School of Public 
and Environmental Affairs 
Indiana University
Links
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Risky Business? The Cuban Democracy Act of 1992
by Susan Kaufman Purcell
T he stated purpose of Congressman Robert Toricelli’s (D-NJ) “Cuban Democracy Act of 1992,” introduced in the House of Representatives on Feb­
ruary 5, 1992, is the prom otion of 
“a peaceful transition to democracy 
in Cuba.” It is m ore likely, how­
ever, that the proposed bill will un­
derm ine the good relations that 
exist between the US and its dem o­
cratic friends in the hem isphere 
and Europe while falling far short 
of its stated goal.
The authors of the so-called 
Toricelli bill adm it that “events 
in the form er Soviet Union and 
Eastern Europe have dramatically 
reduced Cuba’s external support 
and threaten Cuba’s food and oil 
supplies.” They also acknowledge 
that Cuba’s economy will not “sur­
vive current trends.” The problem, 
as they see it, is that Fidel Castro’s 
“intransigence” makes it more 
likely that “there could be a col­
lapse of the Cuban economy, social 
upheaval, or widespread suffering.” 
They imply that their bill would 
prevent that unhappy outcom e and 
allow the Cuban people a peaceful 
transition to democratic rule, and 
they propose to achieve this end 
with a combination of sanctions 
and incentives.
The chosen incentives are the 
least problematic as they include 
some policies already in effect.
Susan Kaufman Purcell is vice presi­
dent of the Department of Latin Ameri­
can Affairs at the Americas Society in 
New York City. She is co-editor of Latin 
America: US Policy after the Cold 
War (New York: Americas Society,
1991).
This is the case regarding their rec­
om m endation that telecommunica­
tions between the US and Cuba be 
perm itted, along with payments to 
Cuba for the services it provides. 
This is also true regarding the 
provision for the US president to 
provide aid through nongovern­
m ental organizations for individu­
als and groups prom oting peaceful 
democratic change in Cuba. New 
policies proposed in the bill would 
allow donations of food and the ex­
port of medicines to Cuba. (At pres­
ent, medicines can be donated, but 
not exported.)
The Toricelli bill 
would scuttle current 
negotiations to 
establish a North 
American free-trade 
area and could 
undermine antidrug 
programs in the 
Andean countries.
The authors of the bill, however, 
consider incentives alone insuffi­
cient to guarantee a peaceful tran­
sition to democracy. Among other 
measures, they advocate a tight­
ening of the sanctions already in 
place against Cuba. The current 
embargo only prohibits trade be­
tween the US and Cuba, not be­
tween third countries or even 
subsidiaries of US companies lo­
cated in third countries and Cuba. 
The Toricelli bill, however, would 
change this situation by broaden­
ing the embargo. Specifically it 
would prohibit ships that enter 
Cuban ports to trade with Cuba 
from loading and unloading cargo 
in US ports within 180 days of visit­
ing Cuba. In addition, it would 
deny tax deductions to US subsidi­
aries for otherwise deductible ex­
penses on the portion of their 
income that is based on trade with 
Cuba.
The Toricelli bill would also 
penalize countries providing assis­
tance to Cuba in any form, includ­
ing trade subsidies and grants, by 
making them  ineligible for US aid, 
inclusion in free-trade agreements 
and debt-reduction programs, or 
participation in the Enterprise for 
the Americas Initiative. This sec­
tion o f the bill seems to be aimed 
at Latin America and, if imple­
m ented, would seriously under­
mine current US policy toward the 
region. For one thing, it would scut­
tle current negotiations to establish 
a North American free-trade area, 
since Mexico would refuse to let 
Washington dictate the nature of 
its relationship with third coun­
tries. For another, it could under­
mine drug-eradication programs in 
the Andean countries and prevent 
new accords patterned on the 
Brady Plan from being signed with 
im portant debtor countries like 
Brazil and Argentina.
The sponsors of the bill seem to 
believe that the US has m ore to 
gain than to lose by offering Latin 
American countries a choice be­
tween going along with a tougher 
US policy toward Cuba or going 
their own way and foregoing US 
aid. They are wrong. A North 
American free-trade agreem ent,
6 Hemisphere • Summer 1992
new debt-relief plans, and US aid 
to Latin American countries to cur­
tail drug production and traffick­
ing are not examples of US charity 
or sacrifice. Instead they are poli­
cies that ultimately will benefit the 
US at least as much as Latin Amer­
ica. Consequently, sanctions that 
risk destroying such programs are 
irrational and self-defeating.
O f course, these tougher sanc­
tions would come into play only if 
the Latin American countries 
chose to continue trading or pro­
viding assistance to Castro’s Cuba. 
In theory they could decide to 
change their current policies in 
order to avoid triggering the new 
sanctions. The reality, however, is 
m ore complicated. Latin America 
does not like to be told what to do 
by Washington. It is very sensitive 
to US threats to its sovereignty, for 
well-known historical reasons. The 
end of the Cold War has produced 
a welcome improvement in US- 
Latin American relations and the 
reduction of anti-US sentiments, 
but nothing could better guarantee 
a resurgence of the old distrust and 
animosity than an effort by Wash­
ington to force Latin America to 
adopt its Cuba policy.
O ther areas of the world less 
dependent on US aid than Latin 
America would be affected by the 
proposed bill less directly. Canada, 
Western Europe, and Japan, how­
ever, all trade or have financial rela­
tions with Cuba and would not take 
kindly to a law prohibiting their ves­
sels that docked in Cuban ports 
from loading or unloading cargo 
in US ports for 180 days.
Is it really worth it for the US to 
risk seriously damaging its relations 
with im portant allies in order to 
achieve its policy goals in Cuba?
The answer m ight have been “yes”
during the Cold War, when Cuba’s 
alliance with the USSR posed a seri­
ous strategic threat, but this is no 
longer the case. W ithout the USSR, 
Cuba reverts to what it was before 
Castro’s turn to both communism 
and the Soviet U nion—a relatively
Is it really worth it for 
the US to risk seriously 
damaging its relations 
with important allies 
in order to achieve its 
policy goals in Cuba ? 
The answer might 
have been “yes ” 
during the Cold War, 
but no longer is it so.
poor island country with ten mil­
lion people. It is therefore difficult 
to argue that a policy of accelerat­
ing the collapse of an already col­
lapsing Cuban economy, or even of 
ensuring a peaceful transition from 
dictatorship to democracy in Cuba, 
justifies underm ining US relations 
with im portant friendly dem ocra­
cies that wish to pursue different 
policies toward Cuba.
Moreover, it is unclear how a 
policy that would accelerate the 
economic collapse o f Cuba, while 
simultaneously offering possibili­
ties for increased US-Cuban com­
m unication, would be any more 
successful than the current US pol­
icy toward Cuba in bringing about 
a peaceful transition to democracy. 
The assumption seems to be that in­
creasing the pressure on Castro will 
leave him with no alternative but to 
accept an economic and political 
opening. Yet the opposite may be 
the case. Castro is now internation­
ally isolated; his few remaining 
friends are almost exclusively o ther 
dictatorships. By penalizing coun­
tries that trade with or provide aid 
to Cuba, the US could end up caus­
ing these countries to defend and 
possibly help Cuba as a way of pun­
ishing the US for encroaching on 
their sovereign rights.
Changing the current policy by 
broadening the embargo would 
also distract world attention from 
what Castro is doing to his own peo­
ple and focus it instead on what 
the US is doing to Cuba. In addi­
tion, it would underm ine the 
broad consensus that exists within 
the US regarding Cuba, and US 
policy toward Cuba, in ways that 
would be reminiscent of the un­
happy conflict over Central Ameri­
can policy that dom inated the 
1980s. It is difficult to see how ei­
ther developm ent would advance 
US interests in Cuba.
The best US policy toward 
Cuba is the current US policy. It 
has broad support within the US, is 
already accepted by most of our 
democratic friends abroad, and it 
is contributing to the collapse of 
Cuban communism. Admittedly it 
does not guarantee a peaceful dem ­
ocratic transition in Cuba, but nei­
ther does the proposed “Cuban 
Democracy Act of 1992.” ■
Editor’s Note: Testimony presented to 
the House Committee on Foreign Af­
fairs, March 25, 1992.
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Stopping Airborne Drug Traffickers
by Richard J. Baum
I
t is time the US escalated the 
war against drugs by giving 
federal drug-interdiction agen­
cies the authority to shoot 
down drug-trafficking planes. 
Nothing short of direct force is 
sufficient to deter the pilots who 
routinely shuttle their deadly cargo 
of processed cocaine between the 
eastern coast of South America and 
the Caribbean. The US govern­
m ent already possesses the trained 
personnel and equipm ent to allow 
such force to be used without seri­
ous risk to the innocent. It may not 
be long before Congress realizes 
that appropriating billions of dol­
lars a year for drug interdiction is 
meaningless if US agencies do not 
have the authority to use force.
Surely it would be preferable to 
employ nonviolent means to cap­
ture, try, convict, and incarcerate 
airborne drug traffickers. These 
days, however, US law enforcem ent 
agencies never capture a traffick­
ing pilot. Trafficker tactics, com­
bined with the legal constraints 
within which US agencies work, 
have made trafficking pilots the 
untouchables of the drug trade. 
Only by altering its approach and 
encouraging our hemispheric allies 
to do the same can the US govern­
m ent combat the threat posed to 
its citizens.
War against Drugs
The phrase “war against drugs” is 
misleading. It suggests that US
Richard J. Baum is a Republican staff 
member of the House Select Committee 
on Narcotics Abuse and Control. The 
views expressed in the article are his 
alone, and not those of the House Select 
Committee.
agencies are authorized to fight 
drugs as they would any grave na­
tional security threat: by employing 
all necessary force to protect US 
lives. The Persian Gulf War, rather 
than the current battle against 
drug trafficking, much m ore accu­
rately reflects what US citizens envi­
sion as a true war. During the Gulf 
War the US arm ed forces devel­
oped the plans and deployed the 
resources necessary to fulfill the 
mission outlined by President 
George Bush and his staff. It then 
im plemented those plans until the 
mission’s objectives were met.
Com pared with the Iraqi army, 
the enemy in the struggle against 
drugs is an evasive target indeed. 
Major cocaine traffickers are not 
limited to national territories or to 
particular bases of operation. They 
are dispersed throughout the An­
dean region in countries that do 
not possess the capabilities to elim­
inate them, even if, as in the case 
of Colombia, they have the will to 
fight them  aggressively. The “sol­
diers” of drug organizations are 
not easily identifiable. The most im­
portant personnel in the cartels are 
m ore likely to be “business peo­
p le”—bankers and lawyers toting 
brief cases—than uniform ed sol­
diers carrying m achine guns.
Thus US forces cannot enter 
foreign nations to capture and kill 
the soldiers of the drug cartels. Yet, 
when a plane load of the cartel’s 
deadly product enters interna­
tional airspace destined for the US, 
the question becomes altogether 
different.
The US does not have to con­
tinue its struggle with international 
drug traffickers in a m anner that 
makes the struggle impossible to 
win. Obviously the US government 
cannot send its air force on a few
thousand sorties to destroy the 
Latin American cocaine cartels. 
Still, there is no reason why US 
air-interdiction agencies cannot be 
instructed to adjust their rules of 
engagem ent to include the pru­
dent application of force against 
airborne drug traffickers. The rules 
of engagem ent can, and should, be 
altered.
Every conflict has its rules of 
engagement. Even in the Persian 
Gulf War—a seemingly all-out ef­
fort—US forces were instructed to 
attack only what were classified as 
military targets in order to mini­
mize civilian casualties. The use of 
force is a continuum , the level em­
ployed being dependent on politi­
cal and military objectives as well as 
the capabilities of the enemy. In 
the case of fighting airborne drug 
traffickers, it is imperative the 
continuum  be shifted towards 
greater use of force because the 
current level has proved to be in­
sufficient.
The network of planes and pi­
lots controlled by a drug cartel is 
perhaps its greatest vulnerability. 
The entire drug-cartel enterprise is 
heavily dependent on air transpor­
tation. In the coca-growing regions 
of Peru and Bolivia, traffickers fly 
in the critical chemicals and sup­
plies used in coca processing and 
then fly out the cocaine paste or 
base to processing sites. Once the 
cocaine is fully processed, most of 
it is flown out of the Andes, occa­
sionally to US territorial waters, or, 
m ore commonly, to the Caribbean, 
northern  Guatemala, or southern 
Mexico for transport across the 
US-Mexico border. Though a sig­
nificant am ount of cocaine is trans­
ported on cargo ships, traffickers 
much prefer the speed and control 
provided by air transport.
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A Shoot-Down Policy
If the US government initiates a 
“shoot-down” policy against traf­
ficking planes in international air­
space, then other governments will 
likely take similar action within 
their own borders. Strategically key 
governments, such as those of 
Peru, Colombia, and Mexico, have 
already shown interest in, as well as 
limited capability of, forcing down 
or shooting down trafficking air­
craft. With the US government 
leading by example while provid­
ing technical and intelligence assis­
tance to o ther governments and 
air-interdiction agencies, drug-
another safety measure, it could be 
required that the drugs be recov­
ered and tested by US personnel 
positioned on land or sea, who 
would quickly com municate the re­
sults to the US plane. Finally, con­
tinual efforts to com municate with 
the trafficking plane, in order to 
convince the pilot to land, would 
also have to be required. Traffick­
ing pilots who wanted to avoid 
being shot down would turn them ­
selves in and face charges in the 
US. Such pilots would serve as ex­
cellent sources for US intelligence.
Im plem enting such safeguards, 
especially that of testing the sus­
pected cargo, would be time
Hemisphere
and on the ground, and targets 
would be chosen only if intelli­
gence reports had suggested when 
and where the drugs were to be 
dropped.
Perhaps US antidrug forces 
would not shoot down a plane 
every day, but even a handful of 
“examples” would serve as a potent 
deterrent. Moreover, costs to traf­
fickers would rise as pilots de­
m anded escalating fees. If enough 
planes were shot down, it could 
even become difficult for traffick­
ers to find pilots with the appropri­
ate training and lack of regard for 
personal safety to transport their 
drugs. And if the Andean and Mexi- 
rients were to jo in  such 
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Commentary
Stopping Airborne Drug Traffickers
by Richard J. Baum
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t is time the US escalated the 
war against drugs by giving 
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drug trafficking, much more accu­
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sion as a true war. During the Gulf
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A Shoot-Down Policy
If the US government initiates a 
“shoot-down” policy against traf­
ficking planes in international air­
space, then other governments will 
likely take similar action within 
their own borders. Strategically key 
governments, such as those of 
Peru, Colombia, and Mexico, have 
already shown interest in, as well as 
limited capability of, forcing down 
or shooting down trafficking air­
craft. With the US government 
leading by example while provid­
ing technical and intelligence assis­
tance to o ther governments and 
air-interdiction agencies, drug- 
trafficking organizations would be 
substantially weakened. Such an air- 
interdiction strategy may represent 
the US governm ent’s best chance 
of cutting the flow of cocaine to its 
national shores.
O f course, the most im portant 
drawback of using force against 
airborne drug traffickers is the 
chance of making a mistake—of 
shooting down and possibly killing 
individuals who are not involved in 
drug trade. Though a degree of 
risk is inevitable, it must be remem ­
bered that such risk is always in­
volved in serious operations of law 
enforcem ent and national security. 
Most certainly the risk must be min­
imized. Hence, if US agencies do 
receive shoot-down authority, they 
must be allowed to operate only 
within narrow confines that mini­
mize the use of force to the most 
appropriate circumstances.
Sorting the good guys from the 
bad guys can be difficult for air- 
interdiction agencies because drug 
traffickers are able to mix in with 
hundreds of o ther small aircraft on 
legitimate flights. Fortunately traf­
fickers give themselves away when 
they drop drugs from the hold of 
their planes, since they generally 
do not land during delivery opera­
tions. Considering US surveillance 
and intelligence capabilities, it 
would not be difficult to require 
that, prior to the use of force, the 
drug drop be witnessed by an air­
borne law-enforcement officer. As
another safety measure, it could be 
required that the drugs be recov­
ered and tested by US personnel 
positioned on land or sea, who 
would quickly com m unicate the re­
sults to the US plane. Finally, con­
tinual efforts to communicate with 
the trafficking plane, in order to 
convince the pilot to land, would 
also have to be required. Traffick­
ing pilots who wanted to avoid 
being shot down would turn them ­
selves in and face charges in the 
US. Such pilots would serve as ex­
cellent sources for US intelligence.
Im plem enting such safeguards, 
especially that of testing the sus­
pected cargo, would be time 
consuming. Nonetheless, if shoot- 
down authority were granted, the 
US government would alter its in­
terdiction operations. Instead of 
dispersing resources in an effort to 
patrol an entire area where traf­
fickers might be, it would focus on 
single trafficking planes. Multiple 
assets would be deployed in the air
and on the ground, and targets 
would be chosen only if intelli­
gence reports had suggested when 
and where the drugs were to be 
dropped.
Perhaps US antidrug forces 
would not shoot down a plane 
every day, but even a handful of 
“examples” would serve as a potent 
deterrent. Moreover, costs to traf­
fickers would rise as pilots de­
m anded escalating fees. If enough 
planes were shot down, it could 
even become difficult for traffick­
ers to find pilots with the appropri­
ate training and lack of regard for 
personal safety to transport their 
drugs. And if the Andean and Mexi­
can governments were to jo in  such 
an effort, the balance of power in 
the drug war would substantially 
shift. The shots aimed at airborne 
drug traffickers would be heard 
around the world, sending the 
message to every trafficker that 
the war against drugs had truly 
commenced. ■
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Costa Rica’s Export Strategy
by M aty A. Clark
osta Rica is widely re­
garded as the success 
story of the Caribbean 
Basin, rebounding as it 
did from economic crisis 
in the early 1980s to its 
current position as a regional 
leader in export-led growth strat­
egies. The country fought its way 
back from rock-bottom statistics in 
1982: a debt-service ratio of more 
than 50%, nearly 100% inflation, 
and a 40% drop in real wages, not 
to mention a three-year record of 
sinking per capita GDP. To make 
matters worse, Costa Rica de­
faulted on its foreign debt in 
1981—m onths before Mexico did 
so—and eventually accumulated 
one of the world’s highest per cap­
ita external debts. For the first time 
since 1949, there was serious con­
cern about the possibility of social 
unrest threatening the regime.
Changes in the world economy 
and regional geopolitics had 
abruptly closed off some develop­
m ent options and presented oth­
ers. The old model—based on 
im port substitution and externally 
financed state investment—ran out 
of steam. In this setting the Costa 
Rican government fell under in­
tense domestic and foreign pres­
sure to adopt a new strategy, based 
on deregulating the economy and 
reorienting production toward mar­
kets outside of Central America. 
This new strategy promised Costa 
Rica the benefits of new opportuni-
Mary A. Clark is a doctoral candidate 
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ties—the Caribbean Basin Initiative 
(CBI), the globalization of produc­
tion, and plenty of foreign aid to 
smooth the transition.
In spite of Costa Rica’s 
short-term success, 
several problems call 
into question the 
sustainability of its 
nontraditional export 
strategy.
Costa Rica’s recovery since the 
early 1980s has indeed been impres­
sive: the country remains politically 
stable and, while the distribution of 
income may have become more un­
equal and the external debt con­
tinues to menace, indicators of 
economic growth, inflation, em­
ployment, and real wages have im­
proved significantly. Perhaps most 
impressive of all, the country’s non­
traditional exports have boomed, 
well-balanced as they are between 
agricultural products, seafood, and 
light manufactures. Clothing assem­
bly, flowers and ornam ental plants, 
fresh and frozen fish and shrimp, 
and fresh pineapple lead these new 
export industries.
Can the spectacular export 
growth of the 1980s provide a sta­
ble basis for a new development 
model? How do nontraditional ex­
ports contribute to national devel­
opm ent needs?
Sustainability
In spite of Costa Rica’s short-term 
success, several problems call into 
question the sustainability of its 
nontraditional export strategy. Per­
haps the most serious and imme­
diate problem  is the sheer cost of 
prom oting nontraditional exports. 
The expense exacts a heavy toll on 
both the fiscal budget and the bal­
ance of trade. The most pressing 
issue involves the main fiscal in­
centive to nontraditional export­
ers: an export-tax credit known as 
the Certificado de Abono Tributario 
(CAT). CATs were originally 
awarded to firms exporting non­
traditional commodities regardless 
of the company’s nationality, size, 
geographic location, or product 
line, with the provision that the ex­
ports must contain a minimum of 
35% national value-added. The tax- 
credit certificate equals up to 20% 
of the FOB value of a firm ’s non­
traditional exports and is negotia­
ble on the Costa Rican stock 
exchange.
In the late 1980s the CAT pro­
gram came under fire from both 
within the administration of Oscar 
Arias and from the World Bank for 
draining the public-sector budget. 
CAT expenditures were 19 times 
greater in 1989 than they were in 
1984, and by 1990 they were ex­
pected to account for 8% of the 
central governm ent’s budget.
Given substantial fiscal deficits, 
docum ented cases of corruption in 
the CAT system, and evidence that 
a few large companies benefited 
disproportionately from the pro­
gram, CATs are being gradually re­
duced. Investors warn, however, 
that reducing CATs makes export­
ing less attractive, especially for do­
mestic firms, and they predict a
10 Hemisphere • Summer 1992
consequent serious downturn in 
the growth of nontraditional ex­
ports.
A nother problem  linked to ris­
ing exports is that of rising im­
ports. Many of Costa Rica’s 
nontraditional exports are light 
manufactures—apparel being the 
prim e example—that are assem­
bled and exported by foreign firms 
enjoying the tax-free entry of input 
materials. By subsidizing these im­
ports to the previously m entioned 
extent, the Costa Rican govern­
m ent is prom oting budget deficits 
by not taking advantage of this po­
tential source of tax revenue. More­
over, it is perpetuating some of the 
basic problems that neoliberals 
have stressed in their critiques of 
the nation’s long-standing policy of 
import-substitution development: 
local dependence on foreign sup­
plies, trade deficits, and inflation.
In the case of nontraditional ex­
port firms, dependence on foreign 
supplies ranges from office sup­
plies to pre-cut fabric and ma­
chinery.
Aside from the debate about the 
economic costs of export prom o­
tion, considerable political contro­
versy surrounds the questions of 
who should direct export-promo- 
tion efforts and how the new strat­
egy should be im planted into the 
country’s institutional structure. 
Several Costa Rican officials feel 
that external involvement in non­
traditional export prom otion has 
cost the country its sovereignty. For 
example, in 1988 an advisor to the 
Arias government accused the US 
of setting up a “parallel state” in 
Costa Rica consisting of several 
nongovernm ent agencies funded 
by the US Agency for International 
Development (AID). These AID- 
funded, nongovernm ent agencies
perform  essentially the same func­
tions as those perform ed by Costa 
Rican government agencies.
For instance, AID founded the 
Coalition Costarricense de Iniciativas 
para elDesarrollo (CINDE) in 1982 
to pursue the same objectives as 
the Costa Rican governm ent’s 
Centro de Promotion de Exportationes 
e Inversiones (CENPRO). After years 
of tu rf battles, the better-financed 
CINDE now carries out most of the 
functions that were perform ed by 
CENPRO. Unlike CENPRO, how­
ever, CINDE is neither part of the 
Costa Rican government nor ac­
countable to the Costa Rican pub­
lic. It appears that CINDE has been 
m ore successful in attracting for­
eign export-oriented investment to 
Costa Rica than CENPRO ever was. 
Given the superiority of its AID- 
backed funding, technical exper­
tise, and determ ination, CINDE 
has embarrassed CENPRO’s de­
fenders. But CINDE’s success is
based on macroeconomic policies, 
principally currency devaluation 
and m arket deregulation, that have 
been orchestrated by the US gov­
ernm ent, the International Mone­
tary Fund, and the World Bank. In 
the context of intensifying world­
wide competition for, and spatial 
relocation of, nontraditional ex­
port firms—including the forma­
tion of regional trade blocs—does 
Costa Rica’s current success in 
attracting such investment from 
abroad promise to foster local de­
velopment?
Although agriculture and sea­
food are steady contributors to 
nontraditional exports, the most 
dramatic growth has occurred in 
light m anufacturing and, m ore re­
cently, tourism, the focal points of 
CINDE’s efforts. Most of the em­
ployment created by these in­
dustries is low wage and low skill. 
According to proponents, however, 
such employment benefits Costa 
Rica because it increases family 
income by absorbing “supplem en­
tary” earners—primarily women— 
in the case of the urban-based 
garm ent industry, or provides jobs 
to regional pockets of high unem ­
ployment, as tourism does.
Whatever the role of such em­
ployment may be in local labor 
markets and household econo­
mies, there remains a larger, un­
answered question: toward what 
pattern of national development 
do these jobs contribute? Thus, will 
Costa Rica progress from offering 
itself as a light-assembly export 
platform to building relatively so­
phisticated, vertically integrated 
domestic industries? O r will it con­
tinue to compete with o ther less- 
developed countries for foreign 
investors seeking low-cost produc­
tion sites with privileged access to
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the US market? The specter of a 
possible North American free-trade 
agreement, which could undercut 
Costa Rica’s current attractiveness 
to foreign investors, makes the ex- 
port-platform option increasingly 
risky.
Com pared with tourism and 
light manufacturing, nontradi­
tional agricultural exports gener­
ally contribute more value-added 
to the local economy. The leading 
firms in the nontraditional agricul­
tural sector, however, are foreign, 
not domestic. Superior access to 
market information, transporta­
tion, technological expertise, and 
credit favor relatively large foreign 
firms. Since only a small portion of 
production in the leading nontradi­
tional agricultural export indus­
tries is purchased from national 
growers, small-farmer participation 
in the new export prom otion 
scheme is quite limited. Where 
it does exist, small farmers are 
plagued by problems such as plant 
diseases, poor technical assistance, 
lack of knowledge of market con­
ditions, inadequate credit, and a 
weak bargaining position with 
exporters.
Large and small growers make 
intensive use of pesticides in culti­
vating the new export crops be­
cause achieving the flawless 
appearance crucial to their suc­
cessful m arketing creates extra 
headaches in tropical climates. Yet 
the excessive use of pesticides 
threatens the sustainability of ex­
port prom otion in two ways. First, 
evidence indicates that large 
amounts of pesticide residue left 
on produce jeopardize entry into 
the US, the principal m arket for 
nontraditional agricultural prod­
ucts. To make matters worse, esca­
lating cycles of increasing pest 
resistance and stepped-up pesticide 
application may reach the point in 
the near future where production 
must be abandoned altogether.
The fact that the Dominican Re­
public reached this point with sev­
eral nontraditional crops by the 
late 1980s should serve as a warn­
ing for Central America.
Second, fragmentary evidence 
indicates frightening consequences 
for hum an populations and the nat­
ural environment. Growers from 
Costa Rica and other Central Amer­
ican countries report symptoms of 
pesticide illness as well as bird and 
fish kills stemming from contami­
nated fresh water sources. They 
also report the destruction of for­
est areas as a result of the opening 
of new export-production sites. 
There is no telling what the longer- 
term impact may be on animal pop­
ulations, soil, and ground water.
Challenges
A few years of spectacular export 
figures are not worth the long-
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range degradation of Costa Rica’s 
natural resources. With a decade of 
experience, critics and proponents 
alike recognize the pitfalls of the 
current scheme of nontraditional 
export prom otion. The time is ripe 
to push the new export model to­
ward m ore equitable and sustain­
able development.
Costa Rica may find greater sta­
bility by intensifying the current 
movement toward trade diversifica­
tion, in terms o f both finding new 
markets for nontraditional exports 
and renewing efforts to establish re­
gional trade agreements. Export in­
centives should be reduced and 
used selectively to target the types 
of industries and jobs that offer 
Costa Rica higher wages, more sta­
ble employment, and technological 
transfers. Lastly, environmental 
protection is crucial not only if 
high-value agricultural products 
are to become perm anent export 
commodities, but also for the 
health of growers and the con­
servation of flora and fauna.
Such policy reform  requires two 
things: increased governm ent ad­
ministrative capacity and a political 
coalition dem anding and support­
ing such changes. Improved m ana­
gerial capacity is compatible with a 
smaller but m ore efficient state. In 
an age of austerity, the problem  
will be locating the resources to 
train and pay more sophisticated 
state administrators. The second re­
quirem ent is that political parties, 
above all, the Partido Liberation 
National, pull away from their cur­
ren t preoccupation with the de­
mands of exporters, the financial 
sector, and the international bank­
ing and aid community to incor­
porate peasants and the urban 
working and middle classes into 
political coalitions unified by a 
broad vision of sustainable devel­
opm ent. Any support for such 
coalitions faces the formidable 
obstacles posed by the fragility of 
Costa Rica’s economic situation 
and its need for m ajor injections 
of capital from foreign investors 
and international financial institu­
tions. ■
John D. French, Editor
The only publication exclusively dedicated to:
News on Latin American trade unions 
and their struggles
News on Inter-American labor solidarity
The latest research 
about labor, workers, and women
News on labor studies organizations and projects
□  Please enter my subscription (two issues) for US $15.00 (US $30.00 institutional).
Back issues US $7.50 individual /  $15.00 institutional.
□ Please send me
___  sets of the English and Non-English bibliographies of recent books and articles on
Latin American labor at US $6.00.
copy(ies) of "Labor Studies in Brazil," by Sonia de Avelar (Occasional Paper #1), at 
US$1.00 each.
__  copy(ies) of "Recent Studies on Organized Labor and the Working Class," by Hobart
A. Spalding (Occasional Paper #2), at US$2.50 each.
___  copy(ies) of "Colombia Balance Huelgmstico de 1990," by Alvaro Delgado
(Occasional Paper #3), at US 2.50 each.
___  copv(ies) of Robert Alexander: The Complete Bibliography of a Pioneering Latin
Americanist at US $12.00.
Please make check payable to "Florida International University."
Address
Mail this form with your payment to:
Latin American Labor Studies Publications 
Center for Labor Research and Studies 
Florida International University 
University Park-W MO TR #2 
Miami, Florida 33199
Hemisphere • Summer 1992
Reports: Trade and Ecology
GATT: The Right to Life Forms
by Paula L. Green
ome of the world’s biggest 
companies are waging a 
little-publicized, high 
stakes war over the patent 
rights to plants, animals, 
and other life forms. Ac­
cording to the experts, the contest 
could ultimately yield billions of 
dollars in royalties for patent hold­
ers from the sale of new medicines, 
crop varieties, or even breeds of 
animals developed from the initial 
patents. The companies, and their 
huge product development budg­
ets, are pitted against developing 
nations that claim that the corpora­
tions are stealing their natural re­
sources to fuel the development 
process.
Backed by their governments, 
multinationals like Monsanto are 
pressing their case in Geneva, 
where the 103 signatories to the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) have been strug­
gling for more than five years to 
write new rules for world trade in 
goods and services. According to 
M onsanto’s William Duffey— 
general patent counsel for the St. 
Louis-based chemical giant—pat­
ents are “needed to give incentives 
to researchers to take risks . . . , to 
try and develop pharmaceuticals 
and agro-chemicals. If there’s no 
patent protection for discovery, 
companies like ours are not going 
to invest that kind of money for 
new medicines and new agro­
chemicals.”
Confronting them, however, 
are the developing nations that ac­
cuse the multinationals of stealing 
Third World plants and crop varie-
Paula L. Green is a reporter covering 
international trade and business for the 
Journal of Commerce.
ties along with the knowledge re­
quired to use them. As if that were 
not enough, these nations con­
tend, the multinationals later re­
turn the supposedly pilfered goods 
to the developing countries—pre­
viously patented and now sporting 
a huge price tag. Walter Reid, se­
nior associate at the World Re­
sources Institute in Washington, 
DC, summed up the conflict this 
way: “The developing countries say 
the North is patenting genes devel­
oped by farmers in the South . . . , 
and then the patented crop varie­
ties are being sold back to the
Developing nations 
accuse the 
multinationals of 
stealing Third World 
plants and crop 
varieties along with 
the knowledge 
required to use them.
farmers in the South. They (West­
ern companies) are getting the 
genes free of charge and selling 
the patented products back to the 
farmer. . . . T hat’s the political de­
bate.” According to agro-economist 
Pat Mooney, policy coordinator for 
C anada’s Rural Advancement Foun­
dation International, “The fear is 
that those who have the knowledge 
and legal means will canvass and 
ransack the forests of the Third 
World and claim rights to whatever 
they see.”
A perfect illustration of Third 
World fears is the case of US pat­
en t No. 559. This patent gives its 
holder all rights to a rare variety of 
flower found in the distant rain for­
ests of Guatemala. A US citizen ob­
tained the patent in the 1940s after 
stumbling across the unique strain 
while vacationing there. According 
to Mooney, “He selected the best 
of the seeds, destroyed the rest and 
took out a patent on the variety,” 
which is now known as “Black 
Prince.”
The current Uruguay Round of 
GATT talks is the first to address 
the protection of intellectual prop­
erty. Such property includes pat­
ents and trademarks as well as 
copyrights on everything from 
com puter software to films to video 
recorders. With the general nego­
tiations bogged down in a bitter 
controversy over agricultural sub­
sidies, no one interviewed for this 
report was willing to predict the 
final result of the associated Ge­
neva talks on the protection of in­
tellectual property. “The outcome 
of the talks depends on what hap­
pens on other areas of negotia­
tions,” said Abdulgawi Yusuf, legal 
policy director for the UN Con­
ference on Trade and Develop­
m ent (UNCTAD). “The issue of 
patents will be the last issue to be 
decided. It requires political deci­
sions.”
The rifts at the GATT negotiat­
ing table extend beyond the tradi­
tional North-South divisions. While 
the US and Japan advocate patent­
ing all life forms, up to but not in­
cluding humans, the EC takes a 
more pragmatic view. Karl Falken- 
berg, a counselor in the EC delega­
tion to GATT, said the community 
has no stated negotiating position 
on the issue but will “wait to see
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what’s in it for us.” Mooney ob­
served that the EC delegation has 
resisted the patenting of any life 
forms above the level of a plant.
Some Western corporations in­
sist that “inventions” based on life 
forms such as microorganisms 
need patent protection because 
their reproduction is tougher to 
control. London-based Imperial 
Chemical Industries PLC, through 
its ICI seed division, takes that posi­
tion. According to Tim Roberts, 
who is intellectual property m an­
ager for ICI, an industrial inven­
tion must be designed and built 
before it can be reproduced, but a 
living organism can reproduce it­
self once it is released. He stressed 
that companies need protection 
for costly biotechnological develop­
ments that could improve the en­
vironm ent—developments like 
microorganisms that can clean up 
hazardous wastes or a new type of 
potato plant that produces twice, 
the norm al yield. As Roberts put it, 
“Unless there’s protection for com­
mercial use, the original invest­
m ent would never be recovered.” 
He concluded by stating that the 
UK parent company—which he 
says is not involved in animal re­
search—favors the patenting of life 
forms up to the level of plants.
Many nations, however, want to 
exclude the patenting of life forms 
from the negotiations simply be­
cause the information is so new. 
“The implications of the technolog­
ical advances are too uncertain. We 
want to see how the new biotech­
nology may evolve,” said Antonio 
Trom betta, Argentina’s negotiator 
on intellectual property rights. “It’s 
too early a stage to have an interna­
tional agreem ent. It would be diffi­
cult to change.”
Cultural Survival, a human- 
rights organization for indigenous 
people, does not believe interna­
tional trade talks and treaties are 
the best ways to preserve either the 
life forms or the knowledge of de­
veloping nations and their native 
communities. “My attention is on
getting the company to do it right,” 
said Jason Clay, director of re­
search for Cultural Survival, which 
is based in Cambridge, Massachu­
setts. “I’m suspicious of conven­
tions and treaties.”
According to Abdulgawi Yusuf 
of the aforem entioned UNCTAD, 
developing nations should be work­
ing to protect intellectual property 
rights to their plants, animals, and 
genetic resources before the sub­
stances are taken out of the coun­
tries by Western companies and 
government agencies. "Many times, 
one hand doesn’t know what the 
o ther is doing. The awareness has 
not really reached the policymak­
ing stage. The only thing (devel­
oping nations) can do for now is 
resist as m uch as they can the pat­
enting of genetic resources.” ■
Editor’s Note: Adapted with permission 
from //^'Journal of Commerce (De­
cember 16, 1991).
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Bachata: From Raw to Rosy
by Deborah Pacini Hernandez
ith m ore than 3.5 
million albums sold 
and six hit singles 
since its 1990 re­
lease, Bachata Rosa, 
by the Dominican 
Republic’s Juan Luis Guerra and
4.40, is the most commercially 
successful recording in the recent 
history of Latin American music. In 
1992, when major US rock perform ­
ers had to cancel dates or reduce 
prices because of faltering ticket 
sales, 4.40 com m anded $35 a ticket 
in solidly booked appearances 
throughout their US tour. Given 
that the venues were in the US, 
such success was a first for a Latin 
American band, but not the last for
4.40. After skyrocketing onto the 
Billboard charts, their popularity 
was noted by the likes of the New 
York Times, Rolling Stone, the Village 
Voice, and even the Wall Street Jour­
nal, but despite the volume of ac­
claim, very little attention has been 
paid to the history and nature of 
the bachata genre that inspired sev­
eral of the songs in Bachata Rosa.
Origins
The Diccionario de la Lengua Es- 
panola defines “bachata'’ as a spon­
taneous and informal backyard 
get-together. In rural areas of the 
Dominican Republic, bachatas in­
clude plenty o f food and drink and 
are enlivened by either guitar or 
accordion-based music, but it was
Deborah Pacini Hernandez is assistant 
director of the Center for Latin Ameri­
can Studies at the University of Florida. 
Her publications include “Cantando la 
cama vacia: Love, Sex and Gender Re­
lationships in Dominican bachata, ” 
Popular Music (1990).
not until the 1970s that the term 
bachata came to include guitar- 
based music. Only then did it jo in  
the ranks of Dominican and other 
Hispanic-Caribbean genres such as 
bolero, son, guaracha, guajira, corrido, 
and ranchera.
While guitar-based ensembles 
had long been the preferred music 
in the Dominican Republic’s rural 
areas, beginning in the 1930s the 
accordion-based merengue was sin­
gled out and favored by the dic­
tator Rafael Trujillo, who in the 
1940s and 1950s personally began 
to encourage—by patronizing top- 
notch orquestas (or big bands)— 
new, sophisticated versions of the 
rural merengue that were m eant for 
the urban salon. Com pared to 
these large cosmopolitan ensem­
bles, rural guitar trios appeared 
rustic and provincial. Thus, while 
guitar-based music continued to be 
played by folk musicians at bachatas 
and o ther social gatherings, few if 
any recording opportunities were
available to these self-taught rural 
musicians.
The post-Trujillo era witnessed 
profound dem ographic and social 
changes. When Trujillo died in 
1961, 70% of the Dominican Re­
public’s 3 million people lived in 
rural areas. With the fall of the die 
tatorship, rural migrants began to 
pour into the capital city of Santo 
Domingo, and they took their 
preference for guitar-based music 
with them. Though Santo Domin­
go was soon ringed by shantytowns 
filled with the unemployed and 
desperately poor, guitar-based 
music—so closely associated with 
the rural and urban poor—was un­
able to challenge merengue's hege­
mony. Nevertheless, opportunities 
did open up for guitar music, if 
only on a small scale. Small, inde­
pendent recording studios and 
producers provided new opportu­
nities for poor and inexperienced 
Dominican musicians to record, 
while, at the same time, small local
Backyard Bachata
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radio stadons catered to a widen­
ing variety of tastes. Rural musi­
cians who were unable to record or 
prom ote their music during the 
Trujillo era began to finance their 
own records and to seek radio play 
wherever they could find it. The 
first to do so were Jose Manuel 
Calderon, Luis Segura, and Oscar 
Olmos. Their ensembles, whose in­
strum entation has changed little to 
this day, consisted of two guitars, 
bongos, and maracas.
These early pressings were 
poorly recorded, produced, and 
m anufactured. Still, they found im­
mediate acceptance in the country­
side and urban shantytowns, where 
people with rural origins contin­
ued to prefer guitar-based music. 
Most of the music produced was of 
the bolero genre, although other gui- 
tar-based genres were recorded as 
well. The romantic song texts, com­
posed by people with little if any 
formal education, were usually 
written in a rather rustic and un­
adorned style, little resembling the 
florid Cuban boleros that they were 
imitating.
The decade of the 1960s, then, 
was the formative period for the 
bachata, when its distinctive fea­
tures were established: the basic 
guitar-centered ensemble with its 
unpolished singing style, collo­
quial language and imagery, and a 
preoccupation with relationships 
between m en and women. This 
guitar-based music—so clearly 
grounded in the customs and 
problems of the poor—became 
the object of increasing criticism 
and disparagement. Bachata was 
unfavorably com pared with salsa, 
orquesta merengue, and balada, as 
well as US rock, which together 
dom inated the mainstream Do­
minican music scene.
During the 1970s, as the Domin­
ican Republic’s economic and so­
cial fortunes seemed to be on the 
rise, the middle and upper classes 
regarded the rustic guitar-based 
music as incompatible with the 
country’s newly acquired m odern 
self-image. For the first time the 
music was labeled “bachata,” a word
that acquired the negative conno­
tation of rural backwardness and 
vulgarity. Bachata was shunned by 
major radio stations in urban areas, 
and record stores in urban, middle- 
class areas refused to sell it.
“I  have a little car 
that’s a delight 
I f  I ’m with a woman 
it goes faster 
I  keep my car in the 
carport
But I  take it out for my 
female neighbor 
Come here, neighbor, 
and don’t be afraid 
I ’m going to take the 
car out to give you 
a ride”
— Excerpted from “ElCarrito” 
by Tony Santos (1985)
While bachata was denied access 
to prom otion and distribution 
through the channels available to 
o ther forms of popular music, its 
popularity am ong the rural and 
urban poor expanded throughout 
the 1970s. Sold in markets and bus 
stops all over the country, the 45- 
rpm  disks filled the shelves in 
makeshift street stalls owned and 
operated by people belonging to 
the same low socioeconomic class 
as bachata musicians and their au­
dience. Nonetheless, the major 
means of dissemination was, and 
still is, the colmado, or neighbor­
hood store, whose owners main­
tained their record collections 
up-to-date in order to please the 
customers and to encourage them 
to linger, socialize, and, of course, 
buy more beverages. Moreover,
while neighborhood barras, or bars, 
were sometimes associated with 
prostitution, they were the only 
public spaces available to residents 
o f poor neighborhoods for music, 
dancing, and drinking. The music 
most often played at barras and col- 
mados was bachata, which, unlike 
the o ther popular genres, was sel­
dom  if ever heard on major radio 
or television stations.
Raw Bachata
By 1980 bachata reflected the na­
tion’s worsening economic condi­
tion. Extended rom antic courtship 
and a lifetime of marriage were no 
longer valid ideals in these urban 
shantytowns, where unions tended 
to be short-lived and dictated by 
money. The lyrics of bachata cor­
respondingly became more sexu­
ally explicit, reflecting the crude 
shantytown realities of barroom  
brawls, lack of money to provide 
for a stable relationship, and tran­
sient affairs. Where boleros had ex­
pressed exalted feelings of eternal 
love, bachata lyrics more frequently 
expressed simply the desire for im­
mediate sexual gratification. Mean­
while, tourists, visiting Dominican 
expatriates, and highly sophis­
ticated Dominican TV with its 
seven color stations and US satel­
lite broadcasts, flaunted a lifestyle 
that was unattainable to the poor.
In the 1980s a variant of the sex­
ually explicit song, the dobk sentido 
(double m eaning), was popular­
ized by a younger generation of 
singers such as Tony Santos, Julio 
Angel, “El Solterito del Sur,” and Bias 
Duran. In these songs, objects of 
daily life—vehicles, food, utensils— 
became m etaphors for body parts 
and functions. The verbal play, 
relying on the contrast between 
m undane objects and explicit sex­
uality, was considered extremely hu­
morous by the bachata audience; it 
was shocking, however, to main­
stream Dominican society and be­
came the target o f severe criticism. 
The term "bachata," which in the 
previous decade simply implied 
rural backwardness and ignorance,
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came to suggest another set of so­
cially unacceptable features that 
were attributed to the “underclass,” 
including illicit sex, violence, and 
heavy drinking.
To their credit, the musicians 
who still played the more romantic 
variety of bachata resisted these dis­
paraging associations. Around
1982 they began publicizing per­
formances as fiestas de amargue (bit­
terness). The music became musica 
de amargue. a reference to the feel­
ing of nostalgia and suffering that 
characterized their music. This was 
a deliberate attem pt to confer so­
cial prestige upon the musician 
and the audience by distinguishing 
the merely em bittered songs from 
the “vulgar” ones, thereby associ­
ating the more rom antic variety 
with social respectability. For ex­
ample, one newspaper reporter as­
serted, "Amargue denotes sorrow 
and sadness, bachata carousing and 
vulgarity” (Hoy, August 25, 1983).
It is hard to say whether it was 
the new name, the appeal of the 
sexually explicit lyrics, or other 
socioeconomic factors that were 
responsible for a brief surge of 
widespread interest in bachata, but 
for a short period it became fash­
ionable listening for the Domin­
ican middle classes. The better 
known performers such as Luis 
Segura began playing in elegant 
hotels and nightclubs for standing- 
room-only crowds. This intrusion 
into mainstream society did not 
occur, however, without resistance 
and controversy. A concert held in
1983 at the national university in 
Santo Domingo was severely criti­
cized by the university’s dean as 
being unworthy of presentation at 
a public institution. The polemic 
that followed the concert and the 
dean’s comments revealed deep 
class and regional divisions in 
Dominican society. The boom de 
amargue, as it was called, was short­
lived, though, and by 1985 the 
music was again relegated to its 
form er underclass contexts and to 
its inferior and virtually invisible 
status in mainstream Dominican 
society.
Romantic bachatas continued to 
be produced, though most of these 
songs expressed a specific subset of 
emotions related to love, such as 
despair, indignation, and the suf­
fering caused by deception and be­
trayal. Trouble was almost always 
attributed to an unfaithful woman, 
but one can discern that these 
songs also implicitly expressed the 
breakdown of traditional family 
structure, frustration at lack of life 
choices, and an increased percep­
tion of drinking and violence as 
valid responses to these personal 
and social crises. Bachata, unlike 
the sophisticated, internationally 
successful merengue, did not reflect 
a glitzy middle-class lifestyle unat­
tainable to the bachata audience.
Bachateros adapted 
the stereotype and 
flaunted it with 
total disregard for 
the disapproval 
of mainstrea m 
Dominican society.
The world reflected in bachata was 
neither an aspiration nor a fantasy, 
but a reality considered vulgar and 
uncouth by mainstream society. Ba­
chateros adopted the stereotype and 
flaunted it with total disregard for 
the disapproval of mainstream Do­
minican society: the very directness 
of bachata songs posed a deliberate 
challenge to the values of a society 
that consistently excluded bachata's 
practitioners and audience.
Rosy Bachata
Enter Juan Luis Guerra and 4.40. 
Their extraordinary success has put 
the previously despised bachata on 
the international music map. How 
close are the recording’s key songs 
to the grassroots bachatas upon 
which they are based? First, there is
a fundam ental difference between 
the stark simplicity of street bachata 
and G uerra’s elegant, sophisticated 
version. The latter can be catego­
rized as bachatas only because they 
are rendered with the typical ba­
chata instrum entation of guitar, 
maracas, and bongos, and are sung 
in an emotional, plaintive manner. 
In the case of “Burbujas de amor,” 
the similarity extends to the use of 
sexual double m eaning in the lyr­
ics. The crude shantytown reali­
ties—so clearly reflected in the 
grassroots bachata—are absent.
Guerra is not alone, however, in 
drawing upon bachata for artistic in­
spiration. In fact, the “dressed u p ” 
bachatas that have em erged in the 
wake of G uerra’s success are re­
ferred to in the Dominican Re­
public as tecnobachatas. Because 
they have transformed it into 
something exotic and palatable 
for the middle-class audiences that 
scorned it, these musicians might 
be criticized for exploiting the ba­
chata. Still, in G uerra’s case at least, 
he has drawn upon the genre in 
much the same way he has drawn 
upon other Dominican folk genres 
in the past—with respect and integ­
rity. It is also significant that he 
chose the word “bachata'' instead of 
the more polite term "amargue,” 
thereby expressing solidarity with 
the music in its m ore socially un­
acceptable form.
G uerra’s admirers should 
bear in mind, however, that his 
bachatas—composed by a sophis­
ticated and economically com­
fortable urban intellectual—are 
interpretations of a local genre firmly 
rooted in the social realities. Ideal­
ly his commercial windfall will 
trickle down to bachata musicians— 
who themselves have never enjoyed 
even a glimmer of his success—in 
the form of a perm anent cultural 
legitimacy within the Dominican 
Republic. Even better, perhaps Do­
minicans and other fans of Latin 
American music will seek out re­
cordings by street-level bachateros so 
that they can hear and support ba­
chata as it was, and is, made—by 
people on the margins of society. ■
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Manley’s Legacy
by Anthony Payne
ew political leaders in 
Latin America and the 
Caribbean return to of­
fice a second time, and 
fewer still by reelection 
after a previous defeat. 
One of the notable exceptions was 
Jam aica’s Michael Manley and his 
People’s National Party (PNP). In 
February 1989—more than eight 
years after Prime Minister Manley 
and the PNP were soundly rejected 
by voters for failing to build dem o­
cratic socialism in Jamaica—Man­
ley was again in office as prime 
minister.
The Michael Manley of 1989 
was, to all appearances, a very 
different figure from the radical 
firebrand of a few years earlier.
The international media quickly 
dubbed him the “new” Manley. 
They noted that he now wore busi­
ness suits rather than the open- 
necked karebas fashionable in 
Jam aican governmental circles in 
the 1970s, that he spoke warmly 
about future close relations with 
the US than as opposed to Cuba, 
and that he appeared to have es­
chewed the language of socialism 
for that of political moderation 
and free-market economics.
But was there really a “new” 
Manley? It is an appropriate time 
to ask this question, for at the end 
of March 1992, Manley resigned as 
prim e minister and left Jamaican 
politics after 40 years of active and 
always controversial involvement. 
Since his new government had 
been in office for more than three
Anthony Payne is reader in politics at 
the University of Sheffield in England. 
He is co-editor o/M odern Caribbean 
Politics (Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1992).
years at that point, we can indeed 
evaluate the merits of the “new 
Manley” thesis. The key issue is not 
so m uch Manley’s altered political 
style—which may simply have re­
flected tactical judgm ents—or even 
his core ideological beliefs (which 
may have changed less than has 
been generally assum ed), but rath­
er his actual m anagem ent of the Ja­
maican political economy from
Manley’s new 
approach developed 
haltingly, with Manley 
perhaps having been 
rather more dragged 
along by events than 
cotifidently charting a 
new course.
February 1989 onward. Here, at 
least, there is unequivocal evidence 
of a new Manley at work. His new 
approach did not manifest itself im­
mediately on reelection, but devel­
oped haltingly, with Manley and 
his government perhaps having 
been rather more dragged along 
by events than confidently charting 
a novel course for the Jam aican po­
litical economy. Nevertheless, in as­
sessing the changing character of 
Latin American and Caribbean de­
velopment in the 1990s, the cum u­
lative result was significant.
The Evolution
Manley’s 1989 government evolved 
through four stages. The first was
one of “m uddling through” on the 
basis of a structural adjustm ent pro­
gram inherited from the outgoing 
Edward Seaga administration. Com­
pletely reversing the psychology of 
the 1970s, when the politics of 
change was his dom inant ethic, 
Manley announced that he would 
not “agree to changing anything in 
the m anagem ent of the economy” 
unless he was “absolutely sure that 
change is going to help and make 
things better in some way.”
With the public-sector deficit in­
flated by the costs o f rebuilding 
after Hurricane Gilbert in 1988 
and the burst of spending with 
which Seaga had tried to win the 
election, the Manley government 
had virtually no scope to introduce 
its mildly social-democratic pro­
gram. Though it reached agree­
m ent with the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) on a $66 
million standby program, the gov­
ernm ent was unable to hold the 
economy to the IMF targets, lead­
ing the adm inistration to formally 
devalue the currency in October 
1989. The failure to m eet IMF tar­
gets also led to the suspension of 
the standby agreem ent and the in­
auguration of the second stage of 
the new Manley administration.
While a new deal with the IMF 
was quickly made, it almost imme­
diately ran into trouble. Manley 
publicly argued that the breaches 
that occurred were technical, 
caused by the delay of bilateral do­
nors making promised payments. 
The IMF, on the o ther hand, in­
sisted that the Jamaican govern­
m ent had not gone far enough 
towards retrenchm ent and that a 
further devaluation was needed.
Yet, tension did not reach the 
heights of the Manley-IMF conflict 
o f the late 1970s, and the political
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mood in the country rem ained 
quiet. The PNP did reasonably well 
in local elections in March 1990 
and the announcem ent of sub­
stantial fuel price rises in April of 
that year did not generate distur­
bances. Manley himself was out of 
the country for m uch of the sum­
m er of 1990, undergoing major sur­
gery, with P. J. Patterson serving as 
acting prim e minister.
Indeed, it fell to Patterson to 
launch the change of direction 
that initiated the next, and per­
haps most im portant, stage in the 
PNP government m anagem ent of 
the economy. In a surprise move in 
Septem ber 1990, the government 
floated the Jam aican dollar. Al­
though the administration main­
tained foreign-exchange controls, 
the new policy allowed commercial 
banks to buy and sell hard cur­
rency, with an average weighted 
rate being calculated from those 
rates operating in the commercial 
sector. Petroleum and diesel 
prices, meanwhile, were also de­
regulated.
Patterson and later Manley 
announced that these were not 
measures of expediency, but rather 
the latest in a long line of govern­
m ent maneuvers by which Manley 
turned his back on the protected 
and regulated Jam aican economy 
of the past and em braced the new 
world of deregulation and liber­
alization. As he declared, “now that 
we are em barked on the course, I, 
for one, am excited by the chal­
lenge.”
Deregulation was part of Ja­
maica’s continuing dialogue with 
the IMF. The previous agreem ent 
was in effect reinstated and later 
replaced with a new standby deal. 
Nevertheless, the Manley govern­
m ent rem ained hard-pressed by for- 
eign-exchange shortages and in its 
1991 budget again had to increase 
taxes and cut subsidies, this time 
with more severe consequences 
for its popularity.
The renewal of IMF support 
prefaced the fourth phase of the 
Manley administration. In Sep­
tem ber 1991 the administration
deepened its com m itm ent to de­
regulation by lifting all foreign- 
exchange controls. Manley told 
Jamaicans this action was necessary 
to kill off the black m arket in for­
eign exchange, implying that the 
currency had to be left to find its 
true market value. As the value of 
Jam aica’s currency relative to the 
US dollar fell by 36% in September- 
November 1991, prices continued 
to rise steeply. In light of these dif­
ficulties, Manley’s government
The government’s 
neoliberal strategy has 
been one enormous 
gamble, bom of an 
inability to think of 
any other viable 
alternative in the 
context of the global 
ascendancy of
sank rapidly in the polls. To many 
observers it looked as if Manley’s 
governm ent could be the first one- 
term  government in the history of 
Jamaican two-party politics. Manley 
publicly acknowledged that his poli­
cies were causing hardship bu t re­
peatedly stated that they were 
irreversible. The currency’s value 
continued to slide, falling by an­
other 16% on the third anniversary 
of the governm ent’s election, and 
how far it m ight fall was anybody’s 
guess.
Indeed, the governm ent’s strat­
egy has been one enorm ous gam­
ble, born of an inability to think of 
any other viable alternative in the 
context of the global ascendancy of 
neoliberalism. Manley came reluc­
tantly and slowly to this view before
fully committing his government to 
deregulation. As a consequence, 
he left his adm inistration little time 
for the benefits of neoliberal policy 
to emerge.
After Manley
This was the political context of 
Manley’s March 1992 resignation. 
Given his ill health, speculation 
had long existed that his retire­
m ent from politics was imminent, 
with Patterson being the obvious 
successor. Nonetheless, in a shock­
ing move at the end of 1991, Patter­
son left the governm ent following 
a heated debate over cabinet pro­
cedure. He was under pressure 
because of his role in a scandal 
involving the waiver of duties to 
the local Shell Company. Addition­
ally he wanted to be free to cam­
paign for the post to be vacated by 
Prime Minister Manley. Though he 
was replaced as minister of finance, 
it was significant that he retained 
his position as PNP’s chairman.
Although Patterson was re­
garded as less popular am ong party 
activists than Portia Simpson, the 
only m em ber of the cabinet to 
challenge him for the leadership 
after Manley resigned, Patterson in 
fact won the electoral contest by a 
large margin. Thus he has taken 
over responsibility for the govern­
m ent’s new neoliberal economic 
strategy at a time when there is 
already less than two years to go 
before the latest m om ent—Febru­
ary 1994—when the next election 
can be called.
There is actually little that Patter­
son can do to influence the elec­
tion’s results. In effect, what the 
“new” Manley government did was 
to ask the Jamaican people to suf­
fer severely in order to create the 
basis for an export platform capa­
ble of at last propelling the econ­
omy into self-sustaining growth. 
Local and foreign businesses have 
greater incentives to invest in Ja­
maica today than ever before. The 
success or failure of the new strat­
egy now depends on how they re­
spond. ■
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Insider briefs on people and institutions 
shaping Latin American and Caribbean affairs
Article 27— Watch Out
In one of his most far-reaching re­
forms to date, Mexican president 
Carlos Salinas de Gortari am ended 
Article 27 of the constitution, there­
by giving communal farmers the 
right to mortgage, rent, or sell 
their land. Reports indicate that 
the new law could affect half the 
acreage in the country and as 
m uch as 30% of the population. 
Despite the reported  surge in inter­
est on the part of foreign investors 
in this newly available real estate, 
some analysts worry that m uch of 
the rural population will be forced 
off the land. The consequences of 
the revised Article 27 could be 
further complicated by the North 
American Free Trade Agreement. 
Mexican negotiators have been re­
luctant to open the country to un­
limited corn and bean imports.
The com bination of rural reforms 
coupled with a gradual opening of 
this formerly protected market 
could result in the large-scale dis­
location of rural workers, driving 
them  into urban areas on both 
sides of the US-Mexican border.
Exceptions to the US Embargo 
of Haiti
Sandler, Travis & Rosenberg, P.A.— 
a Miami-based firm specializing in 
international trade law—pulls no 
punches in its April 15, 1992, Trade 
and Industry Report newsletter. In an 
article on exceptions to the US 
trade embargo against Haiti, the 
firm notes that the US D epartm ent
Edited by Mark B. Rosenberg
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of Treasury—specifically its Office 
o f Foreign Assets Control (FAC)— 
issued General License No. 8 on 
February 5, 1992. The General Li­
cense allows, on a case-by-case 
basis, specific licenses to be issued 
authorizing certain US-Haiti ex­
ports and imports. According to 
the newsletter, the “FAC, generally 
a sleepy office hidden in the annex 
Treasury D epartm ent building, has 
been overwhelmed with applica­
tions for specific licenses.”
Worth Seeing
The American Federation o f Arts 
has organized an international 
tour of short films from Latin 
America. Directed byjulianne 
Burton of the University of Califor­
nia at Santa Cruz, the exhibition 
presents 36 works from 12 coun­
tries and encompasses fictional 
subjects, documentaries, and ani­
mations. The offerings have been 
organized into six programs: “The 
L and,” “People at Work,” “Change 
and Conflict,” “M asculine/Femi­
n ine,” “Heroes and Healers,” and 
“Creativity and Expression.” The 
fall 1992 tour will include Miami 
(August 16-September 20), Los An­
geles (September 28-November 9), 
Columbia, Missouri (O ctober 2- 
November 6), Madrid (November 
21-28), and Newport Beach, Cali­
fornia (December 18-February 14, 
1993).
At Least He’s Consistent
Unfortunately for Guatemala, 
Christian Democrat Vinicio Ce- 
rezo’s presidency (1985-90) was
marked by corruption and mis­
management. Cerezo himself dis­
appointed many with his desultory 
personal and political style. It was 
no surprise then, that despite 
ample prior notice, the former 
president expressed his regrets at 
being unable to attend this year’s 
conference observing the fifth anni­
versary of the Esquipulas II Peace 
Accords. Instead, Cerezo sent a 
thoughtful statem ent on the his­
toric peace treaty in a lengthy 
telefax to conference officials.
The recipients were startled, not 
by the docum ent itself, but by the 
point of origin stamped at the top 
of each page: Hotel Fantasy Island. 
The hotel is located in the Bay Is­
lands of the Caribbean, where 
Cerezo was enjoying a cruise in 
his yacht.
No Lo Contendere
A Hudson Institute briefing paper 
on opportunities in Latin America 
provides a predictable outline of 
the region’s changing business en­
vironment. O n Cuba, the docu­
m ent predicts some instability once 
Castro falls in the 1990s. According 
to the analysis, “The role of the 
exile community will be a difficult 
factor if exile groups seek political 
power, as many apparently will, 
and Cubans on the island regard 
them  as foreigners. Regime propa­
ganda has portrayed the exiles as 
millionaires planning to buy the 
island and recreate a Batista-style 
society, and only time will tell how 
deeply those arguments have sunk in. ” 
The author? None other than for­
m er Reagan administration assis­
tant secretary for inter-American 
affairs, Elliott Abrams.
Fools and Follies
Glenn Garvin, who was the Washing­
ton Times' reporter in Nicaragua in 
1983-89, has published Everybody 
Had His Own Gringo: The CIA &  
the Contras (New York: Brassey’s,
1992). The pithy forward to the 
long-awaited book sets the tone for 
Garvin’s hard-charging style. Writ­
ten by analyst P. J. O ’Rourke, the 
forward lauds the author for indulg­
ing in “no heavy breathing over 
Iranian arms deals.” O ’Rourke fur­
ther states that “Garvin shows us 
contra political leaders whose van­
ity and quarrelsomeness turned 
contra governance into something 
like an International Convention 
of First Wives,” and that “Garvin 
puts all the fools and their follies 
into perspective.”
World Bank Environment 
Roundup
The World Bank’s Patrick Low is 
the editor of “International Trade 
and the Environm ent,” a series of 
research papers prepared by lead­
ing environmentalists and trade 
specialists from academia and the 
World Bank. Topics of the 18 pa­
pers range from “Trade Policy and 
Pollution” to “Tropical Forests and 
Trade Policy: The Case of Indone­
sia and Brazil.” They are available 
in the World Bank Discussion Papers, 
no. 159 (April 1992).
AT&T Phone Home
While some may be disturbed by 
the attem pted coup in Venezuela 
on February 4, 1992, AT&T board
vice chairm an Randall L. Tobias 
remains upbeat. Speaking before a 
crowded G reater Miami Cham ber 
of Commerce m eeting just days 
after the incident, he assured his 
business audience that “we are not 
discouraged from investing in the 
region because of this single 
event.” No wonder. As Tobias 
pointed out later in his address, 
AT&T’s Latin American product 
sales soared from $6 million in 
1989 to $150 million in 1991: 
a growth rate of 250%.
Backyard Low Politics
Now that there is no m ore Soviet 
threat in Central America and a 
peace treaty has been signed in El 
Salvador, the US can focus on is­
sues that were neglected during 
the ideological struggles of the 
1980s. Evidence of this is the fact 
that the US trade representative 
placed El Salvador in the Annual 
Report on Major Trade Barriers to 
United States Exports (1991). El 
Salvador was cited because of its 
willingness to condone the piracy 
of works copyrighted in the US. 
The citation subjects El Salvador to 
possible retaliation against its ex­
ports to the US.
What Did He Say?
President George Bush has often 
been accused of “bushisms,” or 
speaking a language that only he 
understands. For example, at the 
Dearborn-based Economic Club of 
Detroit on March 13, 1992, the 
president said: “I am absolutely
convinced—absolutely convinced— 
that in passing the NAFTA, the 
free trade agreem ent with Mexico, 
the N orth American—we call it 
North American Free Trade Agree­
m ent—it will create m ore jobs. I ’m 
convinced that it’s good for the en­
vironment. I believe a more pros­
perous Mexico, and there’s going 
to be prosperity on both sides if we 
can get the proper kind of agree­
ment, will be able to address itself 
to these environmental problems. I 
believe a more prosperous Mexico 
will be an even better m arket for 
US goods. And so I do not accept 
the wisdom of some that says that a 
trade agreem ent is going to result 
simply in an export of jobs. It is not 
going to do that, and I believe that 
we ought to keep pressing for it. I 
d on ’t care what the politics o f it 
are. I think it is best and I want to 
do exactly the same thing—this 
NAFTA, this N orth American Free 
Trade Agreem ent—I want to do ex­
actly the same thing with the suc­
cessful conclusion of the Uruguay 
Round.”
On the Move
Stuart Lippe, who formerly served 
in the US Foreign Service, has 
jo ined  Radio Marti as director of 
research.
David E. Lewis has been appointed 
the new assistant secretary o f state 
for Caribbean developm ent of the 
Departamento deEstado of the gov­
ernm ent of Puerto Rico. Lewis for­
merly worked in Nicaragua at the 
Coordinadora Regional de Investiga- 
ciones Economicas y Sociales (CRIES) 
and with the Ford Foundation.
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Venezuela: Reversal or Renewal?
by Andres Serbin
. . .Democracy and civilian control over the military have distinguished Venezuela 
from the bulk of Latin American states. Did the country’s attempted coup of 1992 
portend the reversal of regional progress toward democracy and demilitarization?
T he attem pted coup against Venezuelan president Carlos Andres Perez on February 4, 1992, was par­ticularly surprising be­cause, for more than 
three decades, Venezuela has been 
politically atypical among Latin 
American countries. This atypical 
status derived from four political 
features: first, a stable democracy, 
based on the consensus of the lead­
ing political parties; second, civil­
ian control over the arm ed forces, 
including rotation of commanders, 
nonintervention in political life, 
and generous social benefits; third, 
social democracy, characterized by 
a capacity to perm it the upward so­
cial mobility of wide sectors of the 
population; and fourth, substantial 
petroleum  profits that have sus­
tained this democratic social and 
political framework.
Fissures in this framework began 
to appear shortly after Perez as­
sumed the presidency of Venezuela 
for the second time in 1988. On 
February 27, 1989, an increase in 
the price of public transportation—
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introduced as part of a severe aus­
terity package that sharply diverged 
from the populism of Perez’s initial 
term  in office (1978-83)—pro­
voked three days of riots and loot­
ing. For the first time since the 
pacification o f leftist guerrillas in 
the early 1970s, the Venezuelan
The political gap 
separating the masses 
from the Perez 
government and party 
constituencies from 
their leadership grew 
increasingly wide.
army intervened to quell civil dis­
turbances. The num ber of civilian 
deaths probably exceeded the offi­
cial figure of 600. The cost of mate­
rial damage in the country’s main 
cities was extensive as well.
Nonetheless, this dramatic popu­
lar response had little impact on 
President Perez—newly converted 
as he was to neoliberalism—or the 
political elite in general—which 
was progressively losing political 
touch not only with the vast major­
ity of Venezuelans but also with 
their very own political parties. In­
deed, during the subsequent three
years the political gap separating 
the masses from the Perez govern­
m ent and party constituencies 
from their leadership grew in­
creasingly wide, especially given 
the sharp contrast between the 
ostentatious lifestyle of the Vene­
zuelan upper classes and the wors­
ening economic hardships of the 
rank-in-file population, m ore than 
40% of whom live below the offi­
cially defined poverty line.
In this context, reinforcing the 
political alienation of the Venezue­
lan majority has been widespread 
and unpunished corruption. Nu­
merous scandals in current and pre­
vious administrations have involved 
governm ent functionaries, military 
leaders, and entrepreneurs. These 
scandals have generally received 
light treatm ent by a political system 
whose appointed officials are de­
pendent on the old guard of politi­
cal parties. Combined with the 
harsh socioeconomic conse­
quences for most of the popula­
tion, the impact on public opinion 
has been to underm ine the legiti­
macy of both the judicial system 
and the political system in general. 
The combination of plunging liv­
ing standards for Venezuela’s ma­
jority and plunging confidence in a 
political system increasingly identi­
fied with elite corruption and os­
tentatious consum ption is the 
explosive ingredient that underlay 
the attem pted coup of February 
1992.
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From Macroeconomic Upswing 
to Attempted Coup
Ironically, the deterioration of liv­
ing conditions for the majority, the 
declining faith in the political sys­
tem, and the attem pted coup coin­
cided with the first positive signs of 
President Perez’s neoliberal pro­
gram: a 9.2% rate of economic 
growth in 1991 and a rate of in­
flation that did not exceed 30.7%. 
Accompanying these signs of re­
covery was the growing confidence 
of foreign investors and multilat­
eral financial institutions in the 
Venezuelan economy, as well as 
Perez’s early 1992 announcem ent 
that a large-scale social project 
would be started to distribute the 
benefits of economic recovery 
m ore equitably.
Months after the coup attempt, 
there is yet little consistent informa­
tion about the ideological orienta­
tion of the rebel military leaders. 
Indeed, their attem pt to seize tele­
vision stations failed, they made no 
other major efforts to disseminate 
proclamations through the mass 
media, they burned  their propa- 
gandistic materials when the 
attem pted coup failed, and gov­
ernm ent censorship has minimized 
commentary on the opposition’s 
motives. Still, the opposition’s 
so-called Movimiento Bolivariano 
expressed the discontent of a sig­
nificant portion of the military’s 
middle-level command. They were 
unhappy with Venezuela’s socioeco­
nomic problems, the corruption of 
political and military leadership, 
the weakening of democratic insti­
tutions, and the frustrated expecta­
tions of the masses. A nother source 
o f military discontent was dissatis­
faction over the long-standing 
negotiations on the Venezuelan-
The “Golpistas”: Who Are They?
There is a cottage industry of books on the “F-4,” the February 4, 1992, 
coup attem pt in Venezuela. T he chief conspirator, L ieutenant Colonel 
Hugo Chavez, is being lionized by many a politician and journalist. 
While he, and his fellow conspirators, continue to have a popular fol­
lowing, the polls indicate decreasing support for a military solution. In 
a poll taken ju st four days after the coup attem pt, El Nacional found 
that 37% supported the attem pt, 20% were indifferent, and 43% were 
opposed. By May 4, 1992, the same newspaper reported that 88% of the 
most recent poll favored a solution within the dem ocratic system.
The golpistas claim to be followers of the doctrines of Simon Bolivar 
and his teacher, Don Simon Rodriguez. While this explains the adop­
tion o f the name “Movimiento Bolivariano" for their movement, it ex­
plains pitifully little else. The following inform ation on the golpistas has 
been widely publicized:
» Three o f the four m ajor leaders (Lieutenant Colonels Hugo Chavez, 
Jesus Ortiz, and Francisco Urdaneta) had been under surveillance for 
the past eight years for their activities against what they called “the 
oligarchical chiefs” of the arm ed forces. Two years ago they were ac­
cused of planning to kidnap the top military com m anders (El Univer­
sal, February 5, 1992).
■ T he total num ber of acdve rebels was two battalions— the Paracaidis- 
tas deAragua and the Brigada Blindada de Valencia (with 30 tanks)—as 
well as others stationed at M aracaibo’s missile base. Their attack on 
the presidential palace and other political locations was m et with stiff 
resistence from the Guardia Nacional and the president’s own guards. 
The threat that the loyal air force (equipped with F-16s) would be 
sent into action was a major reason why the golpistas surrendered.
* Their surrender message noted that “for now” they failed and that 
“new situations will come along.”
■ As far as any ideology or program , little is evident. The oldest golpista, 
L ieutenant Colonel Francisco Arias Cardenas, com m ander of the mis­
sile base o f Maracaibo, speaks in Biblical terms about justice and hon­
esty (El Nacional, March 5,1992). The jo in t letter of February 12,
1992, by Lieutenant Colonel Chavez and others to the governor of 
Zulia has a distinct Theology o f Liberation tone: references to Christ, 
to the voice o f “the Church which is committed to the people,” “ideal­
ism,” “participatory democracy,” anticorruption, etc.
* O f the 357 officers captured, only 55 were still in custody by April 26, 
1992.
Editor's Note: Information collected by H em isphere staff.
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Colombian border in the poten­
tially oil-rich Golfo de Venezuela.
Together, these sources of mil­
itary dissatisfaction intersected with 
a diffuse and ambiguous national­
ist discourse, whose inflections 
stressed the domestic conditions of 
Venezuela without linking them  to 
hemispheric and world trends. The 
rebel conspiracy, however, was lim­
ited to a few sectors of the armed 
forces and, apart from some late ef­
forts to arm university students in 
the city of Valencia, failed to in­
corporate civilians. Reflecting the 
depth of discontent am ong the po­
litically isolated golpistas at the mo­
m ent of surrender, their apparent 
leader, Lieutenant Colonel Hugo 
Chavez, declared that they would 
give up “for now.”
The Aftermath
Following the defeat of the gol­
pistas, Venezuela’s party leaders, 
entrepreneurs, labor unions, and 
neighborhood associations de­
clared their support for democ­
racy. Nevertheless, voices of 
dissidence called attention to the 
conditions underlying the at­
tem pted overthrow of the Perez 
administration. Among the dissi­
dent voices were form er social- 
Christian COPEI president Rafael 
Caldera and leaders of the Movi- 
miento alSocialismo (MAS). Signifi­
cantly, even though civilians did 
not participate in the coup at­
tempt, public opinion polls re­
vealed that m ore than 30% of the 
population supported the golpistas. 
In short, beyond the attem pted 
coup itself lies an alarming accu­
m ulation of popular grievances 
that the Perez administration, as 
well as the political leadership in 
general, must recognize and re­
solve. Unfortunately, so far there 
are few encouraging signs of such 
progress.
O n the one hand, the Perez ad­
m inistration has spoken not of a 
major change of course but of the 
introduction of “flexibility.” In es­
sence, Perez has said that the only 
significant policy change will be
the im plem entation of the “social 
megaproject,” for which he has ob­
tained multilateral funding. Even 
so, the recent decrease in the 
world-market price of petroleum  
raises doubts about the ultimate 
scale of the program.
The fundamental 
challenge confronting 
President Perez is 
not that of improving 
his government’s 
image, but rather of 
seriously reforming the 
Venezuelan political 
system.
On the o ther hand, Perez’s ef­
forts to form a coalition govern­
ment, incorporating the leadership 
of his own party, Action Democratica 
(AD), along with that of opposition 
parties, has proved unsuccessful. 
The new cabinet that Perez ap­
pointed following the coup 
attem pt has not substantially re­
duced the adm inistration’s strong 
ties to the technocratic team that 
formulated its original neoliberal 
policies, though the addition of 
some AD members to the team has 
modified its approach and eased 
tensions between AD and the Perez 
administration. The new cabinet in­
cludes as interior minister form er 
AD presidential candidate Luis 
Piherua Ordaz, widely respected 
for his honesty and seen as having 
a key role in combating corrup­
tion. It also included as foreign 
minister, until he resigned in June 
1992, a m em ber of the social-Chris- 
dan party COPEI. The socialist 
party MAS refused to participate.
In apparent compensation, Perez
also established a Consejo Consultivo 
consisting of representatives of AD 
as well as independent and opposi­
tion parties. This measure, to­
gether with the appointm ent of a 
new head of the Ofitina Central de 
Information, may improve the gov­
ernm ent’s lines of communication 
with the population in general. By 
the same token, the transfer of a se­
ries of corruption cases to the attor­
ney general may, in the short term, 
improve the Perez adm inistration’s 
image in the struggle against cor­
ruption.
“For Now”
Yet the fundam ental challenge 
confronting President Perez is not 
that of improving his governm ent’s 
image, but rather of seriously re­
forming the Venezuelan political 
system. Such reform  must establish 
effective mechanisms for political 
control over corrupt practices and 
for political participation that re­
sponds to the expectations of di­
verse sectors. In this respect, the 
Perez administration needs to im­
plant a series of proposals formu­
lated by the Comision de Reforma del 
Estado. Among these are proposals 
to reform the electoral system so as 
to eliminate the existing top-down 
manipulation of electoral ballots by 
entrenched party elites (known as 
“cogollos”) and to reform the jud i­
cial system.
If these and other serious politi­
cal reforms are not carried out, 
then sooner or later the “for now,” 
as declared by golpista Hugo Cha­
vez, may internalize as a more 
crystallized—and hence more ex­
plosive—amalgam of both the pop­
ular protests of February 27, 1989, 
and the attem pted coup of Febru­
ary 4, 1992. Such an explosive 
force not only could put an end to 
m ore than 30 years of democracy 
in Venezuela, but also could por­
tend the weakening or reversal of 
Latin America’s regional progress 
toward democracy. ■
(Translated by Hemisphere staff)
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Venezuelan Opinion
THE POLITICAL SYSTE
Which concept best describes 
Venezuela’s political system?
Dem ocracy (89.0%)
Should political parties be abolished 
because they are corrupt and ineffective, 
or should they be changed because 
they are necessary for democracy?
Will political parties make 
necessary changes to save 
themselves, or are they 
impossible to save?
Should Be 
Left Alone (4.0%)
Don’t  Know/ 
Unanswered (7.0%)
Should Be 
Abolished (7.0%
Don’t Know/ 
Unanswered (7.0%)
Dictatorship (5.0% ) Another System (2.0%) Should Be 
Changed (82.0%) Will Make Necessary Changes (64.6%)
Source: Adapted from  El Nacional (Caracas)
SHOULD PEREZ RESIGN?
(PERCENTAGES)
EVALUATION OF STATE POLICIESM M
PEREZ SHOULD RESIGN 45
PEREZ SHOULD NOT RESIGN 45
DON’T KNOW/UNANSWERED 10
IF PEREZ RESIGNS,
WHO SHOULD BE NAMED INTERIM PRESIDENT?
Rafael Caldera 20
No one. Perez should not resign. 18
Arturo Uslar Pietri 9
Eduardo Fernandez 5
Lieutenant Colonel Hugo Chavez 3
The Military 3
Don't Know/Unanswered 30
Several others were mentioned by 1% or less of the sample.
Source: Adapted from  El Nacional (Caracas)
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A Culture of Corruption
by Arturo Uslar Pietri
A
 true culture of corrup­
tion has been develop­
ing in Venezuela for 
more than 20 years. 
Corruption is defined 
as the process of decom­
position, destruction, putrefaction, 
and eradication that is produced in 
living organisms when the vital 
force that gave them life and pur­
pose has ceased to exist.
In the moral field a similar 
phenom enon happens when the 
individual or society enters, for 
whatever reason, into a process of 
disintegration, decomposition, and 
putrefaction, in which moral values 
and ethical principals begin to dis­
appear and to be substituted by ab­
ject and base appetites.
Historically many societies have 
been destroyed by this sickness. It 
is active and present in all hum an 
organizations unless a constant ef­
fort is made to prevent it and to 
create an efficient moral prophy­
laxis. Hum an beings are not virtu­
ous by nature, but we can acquire 
virtue, in some sense, by profound 
conviction. As Lord Acton said, 
“Total power corrupts,” particularly 
when dem onic temptation to do so 
encounters no obstacles.
The Temptation of 
Power and Excess
Venezuela was a backward and 
poor country at the beginning of 
this century. Suddenly, in the last 
quarter of a century, there ap­
peared an immense wealth that 
neither government nor citizenry
Arturo Uslar Pietri is a political com­
mentator whose columns appear regu­
larly in El Nacional (Caracas).
were prepared to manage. To 
make matters worse, this wealth fell 
totally into the hands of the state. 
One could not expect the people 
who have exercised the power in 
Venezuela during the last 25 years 
to understand and avoid the nega­
tive consequences of this rapid 
wealth and channel it toward what 
I called, many years ago, a policy of 
“planting the oil”— the healthy de­
velopm ent of the society and econ­
omy of the country. Not only was 
this not done, but because of a 
fatal weakness— the temptation of 
power and excess and intellectual 
limitation—the elites, along with 
the majority of the society, scram­
bled to take advantage of that for­
tune in all of its possible forms.
The country was converted into 
an immense fools’ paradise, in 
which all, as in a trance, stood in 
line to achieve some share of this 
great supply of personal benefits. 
The government became irrespon­
sibly costly, propagating a lifestyle 
of ostentation, extravagance, and 
pathological consumerism that 
penetrated all levels of social life.
As such, not only were the norms 
of moral conduct and intelligent 
utilization of wealth perverted, but 
there was ample opportunity for 
the proliferation of all imaginable 
forms of theft, im pudent splendor, 
illicit enrichm ent, and abuse of 
power.
A Carnival of Appetites
The entire country seemed to 
submerse itself in a carnival of ap­
petites. Consumption and ostenta­
tion were reflected, according to 
social rank, by Hollywood-style 
mansions, fleets of luxury autom o­
biles and private airplanes, luxuri­
ous apartments, shell enterprises,
risky business ventures, and all 
forms of pleasure and opportunism  
afforded by political and economic 
power. The majority was not ex­
cluded from this carnival of easy 
wealth. With an eagerness that 
should have been directed to edu­
cation or health care, the state has 
sponsored and prom oted every im­
aginable kind of gambling, includ­
ing the easy money derived from 
speculation. Consequently, regard 
for work and savings has gone by 
the wayside. The gamesters’ state 
prom oted, through every means of 
communication, every game of 
chance, from horse-racing and lot­
teries to an evil complex of clandes­
tine gaming organizations, which 
could not have existed without the 
large-scale complicity of govern­
m ent functionaries. To all of this, 
one has to add the virtual impunity 
of all those who have committed 
crimes of illicit enrichm ent.
This culture of corruption is 
corroding the soul of the country 
and cannot be confronted and cor­
rected with mere proclamations of 
intent to am end or isolated ges­
tures of repentance. We have to go 
to the core, attacking the corrupt 
practices of gamesters, felons, and 
the state. We have to establish effec­
tive norms and real examples of 
moral and civic conduct. We have 
to educate for work, savings, and 
service and not for the enjoyment 
of easy wealth and splendor. This is 
the challenge that Venezuela has 
before it, if it truly wants to am end 
its destiny, cure its vices, and reach 
its true destiny. ■
Editor’s Note: Adapted from El Nacio­
nal, March 8, 1992.
(Translated by Hem isphere staff)
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Venezuela in Crisis
An Interview with Rafael Caldera
r. Caldera, as one of the 
originators of this political 
system, you know it well. 
When and where did the 
first fissures in the system 
become apparent?
Paradoxically the deterioration 
in the system began when Vene­
zuela obtained a fairer price for its 
oil. When we sold oil at $2 a barrel, 
even after we subtracted the cost of 
production and split the rest be­
tween the government and the 
multinationals, we thought of our­
selves as relatively rich. We were 
concerned at that time with correct­
ing fundam ental affairs. Based on 
the figures presented by the most 
impartial economists, we now know 
that we have never been as well off 
as we were before the oil boom; 
our gross national product grew, 
we industrialized, unemployment 
was reduced, and inflation was prac­
tically nonexistent, as was for all 
practical purposes the foreign debt.
When the flow of money started, 
it engendered two particularly seri­
ous processes and trends: first, the 
tendency to easy accumulation and 
earnings perm eated all social sec­
tors, and second it reached into 
the top political levels of the state. 
This “facilismo” spawned a type of 
corruption that we had combatted 
tenaciously during the first 15 years 
of democratic government. The 
fact is that in those years this de­
mocracy had as goals not only polit­
ical liberty and respect for hum an 
rights, but the battle against the
Rafael Caldera was president of Vene­
zuela from 1969 to 1974for the social- 
Christian party COPEI. He is expected 
to run for the sixth time in 1993 as an 
independent.
corruption that had been an inte­
gral part of all dictatorships. I insist 
on emphasizing this latter point be­
cause it is now popular to say that 
corruption is a result of 34 years of 
democracy; it is not true that cor­
ruption began with democracy, nor 
is it true that there was no corrup­
tion under the dictatorship. What 
is true is that it was the [Carlos 
Andres] Perez adm inistration that 
initiated the criminal insanity of 
contracting unnecessary debts.
The best institutions in 
the world deteriorate 
when they are in the 
hands of people 
ivithout noble interests 
and who use them for 
their own convenience.
Given the extraordinary income we 
were receiving, we could have un­
dertaken great programs and 
works for Venezuela without get­
ting into debt. Definitely this debt 
is the cause of the asphyxiating 
pressure that the International 
Monetary Fund is currently exert­
ing on the country.
Are you sure about this?
I am positive. Additionally, one 
of the very serious things occurring 
in Venezuela is that we blame every­
thing on the system when it is peo­
ple who are responsible. The fact is
that institutions are good when the 
people who manage and represent 
are honest and patriotic. The best 
institutions in the world deterio­
rate when they are in the hands of 
people without noble interests and 
who use them for their own con­
venience.
What is the remedy: changing the 
people without changing the system?
The system . . . ? I wish you 
would tell me what is the system 
you are going to change. Are you 
going to change democracy? Are 
you going to abolish the congress? 
Are you going to establish a m onar­
chical constitution? The reality is 
that people speak of the system in 
vague terms, no one wishes to be 
precise. Specifically we can im­
prove the system by introducing a 
series of institutions or practices 
such as the popular referendum , a 
reform of the judicial system, may­
be by instituting the office of prime 
minister or an ombudsman for 
hum an rights. But all this presup­
poses that the country’s established 
democratic constitutional system 
will not be altered, what will be al­
tered is how it functions. My spe­
cific proposal covers seven points:
■ The creation of a high judicial 
commission to represent not only 
the legal profession but the coun­
try as a whole. This commission 
will select the candidates from 
which congress selects the mem­
bers of the supreme court. It will 
also have the authority to dismiss 
forthwith any magistrate or 
judge—no m atter the rank— 
when it is convinced that an offi­
cial is not complying with h is /h er 
judicial duty.
■ The introduction of a funda­
mental charter regulating the
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function of political parties. This 
should include transparency in 
the m anagem ent of its funds and 
setting limits to its functions; 
since parties are the fundamental 
instrum ents o f democracy, we 
should stop them  from being the 
mechanisms of clientelism, of 
pragmatism, and of abusive pow­
er; in o ther words, we should 
avoid the so-called partidocracia 
(oligarchy of the party).
■ The creation of the post of prime 
minister who will share responsi­
bilities with the president and 
who can be dismissed with a vote 
of no confidence from the cham­
bers; once this occurs there will 
have to be a shuffling of the cabi­
net.
■ The creation of the post of om­
budsman for hum an rights so 
that society can have a spokes­
man, a sort of catarsis y de amparo 
(a protector and upholder of 
rights) when trem endous viola­
tions are committed.
■ We need to categorically estab­
lish the right to information, one 
of the many rights that are essen­
tial and clear to so many sectors 
of the society.
■ Any change in the constitution, 
even the making of a totally new 
one if necessary, should require 
the convening of a constitutional 
assembly that responds to a popu­
lar mandate, not to the will of a 
select few.
■ A nother very im portant m atter 
that should go into the constitu­
tional reform is a transitory dispo­
sition that reduces the present 
constitutional presidential period 
by at least a year; in o ther words, 
after making the constitutional 
reform, we should proceed to 
renew all public offices. The oft- 
repeated phrase that this is the 
last opportunity for democracy 
truly applies to our situation. ■
Editor’s Note: Reprinted from Revista 
ZETA (Caracas), March 12-23, 1992.
(Translated by Hemisphere staff)
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Military Questions in El Salvador
by Jose Z. Garcia
..........................
Political crisis in the 1980s bolstered the military’s formidable power in Central 
America. Paradoxically, however, it catalyzed a peace process that promises to 
tame the military’s might Given the realities, is the optimism justified?
_ _ _ ______ I l _ _______ JS _________ ;
n January 16, 1992, the 
guerrillas and govern­
m ent of El Salvador 
signed agreem ents end­
ing the country’s 12-year- 
old civil war. The peace 
accords owe much of their success 
to international pressure. By the 
time the Bush administration came 
to office in 1989, US policymakers 
were tired of funding the seem­
ingly endless war in El Salvador 
and wanted out. Moreover, the in­
ternational collapse of communism 
was eloquent testimony that time 
was not a friend to the guerrillas of 
the Ejertito Farabundo Marti de Libera­
tion National (FMLN). Success at 
the negotiating table occurred 
when both sides acknowledged in­
ternational realities and agreed to 
negotiate what am ounted to a 
promise to reincorporate the guer­
rillas into mainstream political 
life—a process that will take place 
under UN supervision and with in­
stitutional mechanisms designed to 
increase the public accountability 
of the military and security forces. 
What remains unclear is whether 
there exists enough goodwill on 
all sides to create a viable political
Jose Z. Garcia is director of the Center 
for Latin American Studies at New 
Mexico State University. He has written 
numerous articles on the Salvadoran 
armed forces.
system when the international com­
munity is distracted or has with­
drawn from Salvadoran affairs.
What remains unclear 
is whether there exists 
enough goodwill on 
all sides to create a 
viable political system 
in the absence of 
international pressure.
On paper the accords are ex­
tensive and create institutions to 
ensure compliance. One thousand 
UN observers will spend the next 
few m onths supervising the dem o­
bilization of the guerrillas. A Comi­
sion para la Consolidation de la Paz 
(COPAZ) has been formed that 
includes civilians representing all 
parties in the legislature. Its pur­
pose is to verify compliance with 
the agreements. O ne of COPAZ’s 
tasks will be to supervise the resolu­
tion of land disputes between those 
who hold title to land in areas af­
fected by civil war and those now 
occupying that land. A Comision de 
la Verdad, composed of form er
Colombian president Belisario 
Betancur, form er Venezuelan for­
eign minister Reynaldo Figueroa, 
and US law professor Thomas 
Burgenthal, has been appointed to 
investigate and reveal the facts in 
unresolved cases of gross hum an 
rights abuse committed by the 
arm ed forces of both sides. And 
a Comision Ad Hoc has been ap­
pointed to evaluate and supervise 
a host of reforms contem plated for 
the arm ed forces.
Down-sizing the Armed Forces
Based on the accords, the armed 
forces will be reduced by 50%, to 
31,000 officers and troops. This fig­
ure, however, represents roughly 
twice the size of the arm ed forces 
in 1979, when the war began, and 
is artificially high. For several years, 
army commanders, for various rea­
sons, have exaggerated the actual 
num ber of troops under their com­
mand. The figure 31,000 repre­
sents one-half the public security 
forces, and in fact, may represent a 
reduction of only 10,000 or so. Fur­
therm ore, the accords do not guar­
antee a reduction in the size of the 
most politically relevant military 
group, the officer corps, which, in­
cluding security forces, currently 
num bers some 2,100—twice the 
size of the 1979 officer corps. The 
major substantive change involves 
the dissolution of the five Batallones
Hemisphere • Summer 1992
de Infanteria de Reaction Inmediata 
(BIRI) created to respond to 
FMLN action. Some of these, such 
as the BIRI Atlacatl, have acquired 
reputations as gross violators of 
hum an rights.
The greatest institutional distor­
tion within the arm ed forces is 
caused by the extraordinary num ­
ber of jun io r officers who were re­
cruited during the civil war. In 
1991 approximately 1,500 first and 
second lieutenants were in the 
arm ed forces, twice as many as are 
needed to balance out the 540 offi­
cers of higher grades. Any effort 
made to cut military costs after the 
war is likely to focus on these offi­
cers. Nevertheless, since many of 
them  served in the most dangerous 
positions during the war, the case 
for cutting jun io r officers is politi­
cally sensitive. Moreover, some 
observers fear the social conse­
quences of suddenly cashiering 
700 warriors into an economy that 
suffers from high unem ploym ent 
rates. On the o ther hand, their 
continued presence in the armed 
forces is likely under the best of cir­
cumstances to create a degree of 
instability within the institution, 
which could eventually have politi­
cal significance. Salvadoran history 
has known many instances of inter- 
generational military conflict that 
have evolved into larger national 
power struggles.
The Tandona
Within the top leadership structure 
o f the arm ed forces, no military 
graduating class cohort group, or 
tanda, in the past 50 years has been 
as powerful as the famous class of 
1966. The “tandona," o r large 
tanda, is so nam ed because of its 
unusually large size of 46. By the 
mid-1980s tandona members occu­
pied most of the im portant troop 
commands in the arm ed forces, 
and after Alfredo Cristiani became 
president in 1989, some of them 
moved into dom inant positions 
within the defense ministry while 
others m aintained key troop com­
mands.
As cohesive as they were power­
ful, tandona members were often 
accused of covering up for one an­
other in suspected cases of gross 
violations o f hum an rights or fi­
nancial conflicts of interest. Just 
as resentm ent against their power 
began to rise among ju n io r tandas, 
one tandona member, Colonel 
Guillermo Benavides, was accused 
of conspiracy in the infamous 1989 
Jesuit m urder case. Extraordinary 
pressure by hum an rights organiza­
tions and the US government fi­
nally caused Benavides to be tried 
in civilian court—the first such
While Cristiani 
may have sound 
administrative reasons 
to keep the tandona at 
the head of the armed 
forces, doing so mill 
impede national 
political reconciliation.
instance in Salvadoran history— 
and resulted in a conviction carry­
ing a 30-year sentence. Resentment 
against the tandona on the part of 
ju n io r tandas partly explains why 
this punishm ent was accepted with­
in the arm ed forces, even as resent­
m ent against the conviction exists 
within the military in general.
Tandona members have recently 
been replaced in all im portant 
troop commands except the vital 
Primera Brigada, and several m em ­
bers accused of various wrong­
doings were sent abroad in 1991 
or were otherwise isolated in incon­
sequential posts. Nonetheless, tan­
dona members retain significant 
administrative influence within the 
arm ed forces since the m inister of 
defense and other key m embers of 
the high com m and are tandona 
members. A nother factor con­
tributing to their influence is the
fact that tandas immediately jun io r 
to the tandona are quite small, mak­
ing full replacem ent of the tandona 
problematic. Thus, the remaining 
tandona members in the high com­
m and are likely to retain their posi­
tions o f authority—including their 
still substantial influence over the 
selection of political leadership— 
until 1994, when a new president 
will be elected. By that time the 
tandas o f the early 1970s will have 
m atured enough to assume power.
To the degree that tandona 
members continue to be influential 
within the arm ed forces, some 
resentm ent against the army will 
persist. The tandona has become a 
symbol—of hum an rights abuse in 
some quarters, of corruption in 
others, and, in general, o f the civil 
war itself. While President Cristiani 
may have sound administrative 
reasons to keep the tandona at the 
head of the arm ed forces, doing so 
will im pede national political rec­
onciliation.
Postwar Politics and 
the Armed Forces
A major achievement of the peace 
accord process in El Salvador was 
that for the first time since national 
independence in the early nine­
teenth century, the role of the 
arm ed forces has been debated, 
negotiated, and acted upon by po­
litical parties, the governm ent ad­
ministration, guerrillas, and the 
military itself. This achievement 
alone is significant and has im­
plications at least as wide-ranging 
as the results of the negotiations so 
far. Civilian actors are likely to in­
sist in the future that the subject of 
the arm ed forces remains on the 
public agenda. If so, the peace ac­
cords will have indirectly taken the 
country a step toward the develop­
m ent of shared democratic norms.
With regard to the military, 
the most im portant feature of the 
peace accords is the separation of 
domestic police functions from the 
arm ed forces. The accords call for 
the creation of a new entity, the 
Politia National Civil (PNC), by the
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end of 1992. The PNC will assume 
the public security functions pre­
viously exercised by the Guardia 
Nacional, Policia Nacional, and Poli­
na de Hacienda, which were con­
trolled and staffed by the armed 
forces. In addition, the PNC will 
have its own training academy and 
will be controlled exclusively by ci­
vilian national government officials 
through the Ministerio del Interior.
These steps reverse a m ore 
than a century-old trend in which 
the arm ed forces exercised increas­
ing control over both internal secu­
rity and national defense. In 1912, 
for example, the Guardia Nacional 
was created by the arm ed forces 
and placed under their control in 
order “to protect private property 
especially in rural agrarian zones”
(Revista de la Fuerza Armada [San 
Salvador], 10:38, 1978, p. 17). By 
the 1970s virtually all law enforce­
m ent institutions were controlled 
by the arm ed forces and were often 
associated with hum an rights abuse.
Removal of domestic security 
functions from armed forces con­
trol implies far more than possible 
im provem ent in hum an rights treat­
ment, however. It was through the 
exercise of national guard, police, 
and customs functions that the 
arm ed forces acquired sufficient 
knowledge, networks, and pres­
ence throughout the country to be 
able to govern. And it was partly 
through the exercise of these func­
tions that the military m anaged to 
control the political activities of 
its citizens from the 1950s to the 
1970s, when the army controlled 
an “officialist” party—the Partido de 
Conciliation Nacional—that won all 
elections. The ruling Alianza Re- 
publicana Nacionalista (ARENA) it­
self was founded in part by the late 
Major Roberto D Aubuisson, whose 
support base included village elites 
he had helped across the country 
in his position as chief of intelli­
gence of the Guardia National dur­
ing the late 1970s, when death 
squads began to operate on a na­
tional scale to eliminate suspected 
leftists. In sum, removal of police 
forces from military control implies
a major reduction in the political 
impact of the arm ed forces on Sal­
vadoran society, another necessary 
but insufficient condition for de­
mocracy.
Future Role of the Armed Forces
During the civil war, the Salva­
doran arm ed forces had to learn 
how to fight a guerrilla war. Eventu­
ally they also had to learn flexibility 
in the art of making political alli­
ances, not only domestically but 
internationally as well. Now the 
elimination of their internal secu­
rity functions and the careful scru­
tiny of their political role will surely 
teach the arm ed forces the costs of 
overextending themselves as an in­
stitution. Still, the Salvadoran mili­
tary has survived, and after 12 years 
of war its basic values and mentality 
remain astonishingly unchanged. 
Hence, it is not to the arm ed forces 
that one should look for guidance 
toward democracy, but rather to 
the postwar dynamics of civilian 
politics.
Ultimately the future role of the 
arm ed forces depends on the qual­
ity of the political system that 
emerges during the postwar pe­
riod. Since 1932 a small oligarchy 
using military force has refused to 
acknowledge the political legiti­
macy of large sectors of the polity, 
especially organized labor. This 
refusal is the root cause of the civil
Ultimately the future 
role of the armed 
forces depends on the 
quality of the political 
system that emerges 
during the postwar 
period.
war. From the 1950s onward, the 
arm ed forces, as instruments of 
this oligarchy, extracted increasing 
am ounts of power and privilege for 
their services. By the late 1970s abu­
sive military behavior became more 
of a focal point for opposition (es­
pecially in the eyes of non-Salva­
dorans) than the less tangible but 
m ore fundam ental relationship be­
tween the oligarchy and other sec­
tors of society.
Though the civil war is over, it 
is unclear whether these patterns 
will reemerge. Democratic theory 
and the experience of o ther Latin 
American countries suggest that, 
until all major political actors can 
agree to create and abide by rules 
of the game that limit coercive mili­
tary involvement in politics, the lon­
gevity of the current peace process 
is in doubt.
For the time being, interna­
tional scrutiny and the transpar­
ency built into the peace accords 
will probably cause both sides to 
abide by the agreements, albeit re­
luctantly and behind schedule. 
Compliance thus far has been slow 
on both sides. The real test will 
occur when the Left is able to 
dem onstrate with ballots what it 
could not dem onstrate with bullets: 
that it has strong political support.
W hen the Left dem onstrated 
such support in the past, civilian 
groups tied to the ruling oligarchy 
were always ready to sacrifice de­
mocracy. W hether the pattern re­
peats itself again will depend on 
the resolve with which democratic 
forces forge a. m inimum alliance to 
preserve themselves. Finally, in this 
postm odern civil war, international 
interests—such as governments, 
hum an rights and church groups, 
and writers—played im portant 
roles in articulating issues and m on­
itoring events, including the very 
negotiation of the war’s end. Now 
that the country is no longer en­
gulfed in war and thus is no longer 
a focus of world attention, El Salva­
do r’s democratic prospects depend 
to a significant degree on the con­
tinued scrutiny and passion of 
these players. ■
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Taming the Honduran Military
by Steve Levitsky
I
n few areas of H onduran soci­
ety is the lack of civilian con­
trol over the arm ed forces 
more manifest than in the jus­
tice system. The H onduran 
military refuses to allow its 
members to be tried in civilian 
courts, even when they commit 
common crimes. And civilian au­
thorities, fearful of confronting 
the military, do not challenge the 
arm ed forces’ claim to “military ju ­
risdiction.” As a result, members of 
the military have become virtually 
untouchable by civilian law. “In 
place of a state of law,” the Comite 
para la Defensa de los Derechos Hu- 
vianos en Honduras (CODEH) re­
ported in July 1991, Honduras “has 
a state of illegality.”
The H onduran military, it 
should be noted, is somewhat dif­
ferent from those of El Salvador 
and Guatemala. Unlike the armies 
of its neighbors, the H onduran 
army has never been linked to the 
oligarchy, but rather has tradition­
ally m antained ties with the pop­
ular sectors. In the 1970s the 
military government of Oswaldo 
Lopez Arellano (1972-75) openly 
aligned itself with peasant and 
labor movements against economic 
elites. This explains why many H on­
durans do not view the country’s 
military as highly repressive. In­
deed, the H onduran military’s 
hum an rights record—though far 
from clean—is considerably better 
than those of the Salvadoran and 
Guatemalan armies.
That changed somewhat in the 
1980s. U nder the leadership of
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General Gustavo Alvarez Martinez, 
arm ed forces chief from 1982 to 
1984, the military adopted a more 
repressive orientation, cracking 
down on unions, peasants, stu­
dents, and leftist politicians in the 
name of “national security.” Accord­
ing to CODEH, between 1981 and 
1984, 218 political assassinations, 
110 “disappearances,” and 1,984 
illegal arrests took place. Though 
hum an rights violations have de­
creased since the mid-1980s, Ameri­
cas Watch reported that “political 
killings of student, union and peas­
ant leaders continued through the 
end of ’90 and the first m onths of 
’91.” Military officers were impli­
cated in brutal crimes against civil­
ians on several occasions in 1991, 
yet soldiers are never tried in civil 
courts and few are convicted in 
military tribunals.
A “Shield of Impunity”?
The military bases its refusal to be 
subject to civil jurisdiction on arti­
cle 90 of the H onduran constitu­
tion, which declares that “military 
jurisdiction is recognized for 
crimes of a military order.” Ac­
cording to Colonel Napoleon 
Santos Aguilar, the arm ed forces 
in terpret “military jurisdiction” to 
include “all cases that involve offi­
cials or enlisted m en” in the active 
service of the military. Nonetheless, 
lawyers, scholars, and politicians 
across the H onduran political spec­
trum  are nearly unanim ous in in­
terpreting military jurisdiction as 
applying “strictly to military mat­
ters” such as mutiny or other 
crimes committed during war.
According to retired general 
Walter Lopez, armed forces chief 
from 1984 to 1986, the military 
should claim jurisdiction only over
“internal crimes,” while “civilian 
courts should try all o ther crimes.” 
Leonidas Rosa Bautista, president 
o f the Colegio de Abogados, expresses 
a similar view. According to legis­
lator Salatiel Urbina of the Partido 
Liberal, “All cases in which soldiers 
are involved in crimes against ci­
vilians should be tried in civilian 
courts. If I am a soldier and I shoot 
someone in a bar, there is no rea­
son for me to be tried in a military 
court.” Yet the military claims ju ­
risdiction in all cases where sol­
diers commit crimes. Since the 
country’s police force and investi­
gative bodies are run by the armed 
forces, the military has been able 
to ensure that its members stay out 
of civilian courts.
The problem  is that seldom 
have military tribunals brought jus­
tice. Military judges are active mili­
tary members appointed by the 
arm ed forces. Trials take place 
within military installations, are 
closed to the public, and are in no 
way responsible to the civilian jud i­
cial system. “The military justice 
system’s track record is not very 
good,” acknowledges one US em­
bassy official. “You’ve got second 
lieutenants judging colonels, which 
is very difficult to do .” Lawyer and 
legislator Luis Alberto Rubi of the 
Partido Liberal says, “The army is 
using military jurisdiction as a 
shield of impunity. I t’s totally un­
constitutional. They’re judging 
themselves.”
Judicial Weakness
Despite widespread opposition to 
militaryjurisdiction, few politicians 
or judges have challenged it. AJuly 
1991 legislative proposal to “clarify” 
the definition of military privilege 
was immediately buried in the H on­
Hemisphere • Summer 1992
duran congress, and the country’s 
supreme court has thus far refused 
to rule on any cases concerning mil­
itary jurisdiction. Such a ruling 
would set a precedent for future 
civil-military conflicts by defining, 
once and for all, the limits of mili­
tary jurisdiction.
“The judicial authorities have 
always been afraid of the armed 
forces,” said CODEH lawyer Linda 
Rivera. Yet, Manuel Gamero, direc­
tor of the daily newspaper Tiempo, 
argues that such fears are no 
longer justified: “If the supreme 
court ruled that these military 
crimes should be tried in civil 
courts, what would happen? Would 
there be a coup? Would they kill 
the justices? O f course no t.” Ac­
cording to CODEH, the justice sys­
tem ’s “abdication of civil authority” 
is the fundam ental reason the mili­
tary’s impunity continues to exist 
in Honduras.
In 1991 civilian and military au­
thorities clashed over the issue of 
military jurisdiction in three major 
cases. O n each occasion the armed 
forces openly refused to cooperate 
with the civilian justice system, and 
each time civilian authorities 
proved unable to exert control.
In the first case, known as the “El 
Astillero” massacre, Colonel Leonel 
Galindo is suspected of paying his 
farm hands to attack a group of 
peasant squatters on his land. Five 
peasants were killed in the attack 
on May 3, 1991. A military investi­
gation concluded soon after the 
massacre that “no soldiers were in­
volved,” and although Galindo was 
supposedly taken into military cus­
tody, he was no t tried. As the massa­
cre was a “com m on,” rather than 
military, crime, civil judge Leo­
nardo Banegas asked the armed 
forces to release Galindo to the 
civil court system. They refused. 
Judge Banegas then petitioned the 
supreme court to rule on the case’s 
jurisdiction, but according to 
Linda Rivera, who represents the 
families o f the m urdered peasants, 
“Something always happens so that 
the supreme court doesn’t make a 
ruling. ” Banegas adds that “al­
though it hurts to say it, military au­
thority is superior to civil authority.” 
The military took similar action 
in the case of form er defense minis­
ter Colonel Erick Sanchez, who on 
June 9, 1991, shot civilian Gustavo 
Funez, leaving him semiparalyzed. 
Reportedly drunk and enraged 
after an argum ent with a fellow 
officer, Sanchez shot Funez, who 
apparently was an uninvolved by­
stander. After a brief investigation, 
a military tribunal absolved San­
chez o f the crime, declaring that 
Sanchez had shot the unarm ed
In 1991 civilian and 
military authorities 
clashed over the issue 
of military jurisdiction 
in three major cases. 
On each occasion the 
armed forces openly 
refused to cooperate 
with civilian 
authorities.
Funez out o f “self-defense.” At the 
end of 1991, Sanchez rem ained on 
active military duty. According to 
Rivera, also prosecuting the San­
chez case, civilian judge Wilfredo 
Mendez “never even began pro­
ceedings” against Sanchez and “im­
peded me in my accusatory work.” 
Funez, for example, was never 
called to civil court to make his ini­
tial charges. Rivera called the civil 
ju d g e’s failure to act a “mockery of 
justice.” Legislator Salatiel Urbina 
says that “the fact that Sanchez was 
declared innocent tells the world 
that it is the military and not civil­
ians who rule this country.”
The most widely publicized 1991 
case surrounded the rape and m ur­
der of Riccy Mabel Martinez, a 
high-school student whose muti­
lated body was discovered on July 
15 of that year. Martinez had last 
been seen at a local army barracks 
two days earlier, where she report­
edly went to seek her boyfriend’s 
release from military service. Both 
military and civil investigations 
were launched, but when on July 
26 civil judge Maria Mendoza or­
dered the arrest of two high army 
officials, Colonel Angel Castro and 
Captain Ovidio Andino, the police 
refused to carry out the order. Po­
lice com m ander Guillermo Pare­
des told the press, “I am not going 
to authorize this order . . . these 
boys are in active service and we 
have military jurisdiction.” The 
daily Tiempo called Paredes’s state­
m ent a “manifestation of the domi­
nance o f military authority over 
civil authority.”
The army then took custody of 
Castro and Andino, refusing to 
turn them  over to civil authorities. 
Judge Mendoza petitioned su­
prem e court president Oswaldo 
Ramos to grant the civil court juris­
diction over the case. Yet, after a 
July 30 m eeting with arm ed forces 
chief Luis Alonso Discua, Ramos 
announced the case would be pur­
sued by both the military and civil 
courts, thus refusing to order the 
military to turn over the two offi­
cers. Earlier that m onth Discua 
had publicly declared that Castro 
and Andino should be tried in mili­
tary tribunals. Asked w hyjudge 
Mendoza was unable to take cus­
tody of the two officers, Ramos de­
clared that the ‘judicial authorities 
are powerless” and that Mendoza 
“is not the Bionic Woman or Won­
der W oman.”
Antimilitary Pressures
Two critical factors, however, inter­
vened to prevent the m urder of 
Riccy Mabel Martinez from being 
forgotten, and may well have trans­
formed the case into a turning 
point in H onduran civil-military 
relations. First, the US embassy, vir­
tually silent during the repression
Hemisphere • Summer 1992
Features: Civil-Military Relations
of the 1980s, began to publicly 
dem and that justice be done. On 
July 23 Ambassador Crescencio 
Arcos declared that there was the 
need for “a just and transparent ju ­
dicial system to resolve this and 
other cases,” since “democracy is 
not just elections, but providing 
every citizen, hum ble as he or she 
may be, equality before the law.” A 
week later the embassy called on 
the H onduran government to 
“bring the authors of this horrible 
crime to justice,” and offered the 
technical assistance of the FBI to 
assist with the case.
Arcos’s unprecedented inter­
vention made an immediate and 
powerful impact by strengthening 
the position of the civil authorities. 
According to a US embassy official, 
Arcos’s statem ent “allowed others 
to come out and criticize the mili­
tary,” as politicians could “shield 
themselves behind Arcos” in their 
attacks on the arm ed forces. Em­
boldened by the US position, su­
prem e court president Ramos 
declared on August 2 that the Mar­
tinez case “has to go to the civil 
courts. . . . Why do doctors, econo­
mists, workers, peasants, and busi­
ness people but not soldiers submit 
themselves to civil law?” The mili­
tary leadership, on the o ther hand, 
denounced Arcos’s “intervention 
into the internal affairs of our coun­
try” and called for the ambassador 
to be declared persona non grata.
It is evident that, given the ex­
traordinary degree of US influence 
in Honduras, Arcos’s stance could 
not be ignored. On August 21 it 
was announced that defendants 
Castro and Andino would be tried 
by the civil court system. At the 
same time, however, the military 
announced that both officers had 
been released from the armed 
forces and would be tried as civil­
ians, thereby avoiding a precedent- 
setting trial of military officers by a 
civilian court.
Few Hondurans doubt that 
Arcos’s intervention was decisive in 
the Martinez case. “If Arcos had n ’t 
made that statement, the military 
would have absolved the officers,”
said a CODEH official. Still, do­
mestic pressure also played a criti­
cal role in the Martinez affair. The 
brutality of the m urder, as well as 
the almost certain involvement of 
military personnel, produced an 
unprecedented outburst of anti­
military sentiment. A series of large 
student dem onstrations in August 
1991 frightened the military, which 
responded by filling the capital 
with soldiers. The news m edia was 
also very active, keeping the case 
on the front page for weeks and 
providing a forum for antimilitary 
views. According to CODEH presi­
dent Ramon Custodio, the press 
“played an incredibly im portant 
role. . . .  If the armed forces h adn’t 
had to confront the press cam­
paign, the student mobilization, 
and international pressure, they 
might have arranged the pardon of 
the soldiers.”
“We’ve Lost Our Fear”
The Martinez case may have long- 
lasting effects on H onduran civil- 
military relations. In addition to 
strengthening the resolve of civic 
leaders, it has had an empowering 
effect on the population in gen­
eral. According to H onduran politi­
cal analyst Victor Meza, the case 
“perm itted antimilitarism to be­
come public . . . the army is no 
longer a taboo subject.” This pub­
lic empowerment, sociologist Leti­
cia Salomon has argued, “is very 
promising because the m om ent ci­
vilians feel they can challenge the 
military and seek justice for abuses, 
real changes will take place.” The 
military is clearly on the defensive. 
“Soldiers know things are not like 
before,” says the president of the 
Asociacion de Prensa Hondurena, Mi­
guel Osmando Mejia. “They have 
to be careful. If they kill someone 
now, they may not remain untouch­
able.”
Several im portant steps have 
been taken towards ending impuni­
ty. In Septem ber 1991 the national 
police opened up a complaints of­
fice, reportedly at the request of 
the US embassy. Despite the fact
that those officers deem ed to have 
com m itted crimes against civilians 
are punished internally rather than 
sent to civilian courts, Custodio 
says the office has yielded “some 
positive results.” More im portant, 
the supreme court announced in 
November 1991 that it would in­
vestigate both the Galindo and 
Sanchez cases and make a ruling 
on the jurisdiction of each. Accord­
ing to form er arm ed forces chief 
Lopez, “If the court rules that these 
cases belong in civil courts, two 
things will become clear: one, that 
high officers are involved in hu­
man rights violations, and two, that 
these officers can and should be 
tried in civilian courts.”
So far, however, neither 
Sanchez nor Galindo have been 
charged and the investigation into 
the Martinez killing has moved 
slowly, amid charges that im por­
tant evidence has been tam pered 
with. In addition, the July 1991 
m urder of hum an rights activist 
Marco Tulio H ernandez and the 
Septem ber 1991 assassination of in­
digenous leader Vincent Matute re­
main unsolved. Fear of the military 
has not disappeared, particularly 
among judges in rural areas. More­
over, many question w hether the 
current reform movement could 
be sustained without US pressure. 
Legislator Luis Alberto Rubi asks, 
“The day we d o n ’t have Arcos, 
what will happen? Will impunity 
rem ain?”
Yet others maintain that the tide 
toward civilian control over the mil­
itary is irreversible. “Because we 
have lost our fear of the military, 
the boots and the uniforms d o n ’t 
mean anything anymore,” said Fa­
ther Elias Ruiz, who has braved 
death threats in his effort to bring 
Colonel Galindo to justice for the 
May 3 massacre. H ondurans can 
only hope that his bravado is in­
deed true. ■
Editor’s Note: Adapted with permission 
from Mesoamerica (San Jose, Costa 
Rica), January-February 1992.
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Guatemala’s Military Transition
by Gabriel Aguilera Peralta
Until 1982 the Guatemalan military exercised a di­rect role in the creation of a seemingly endless succession of authoritar­ian governments. The 
massive corruption, electoral fraud, 
and repressive politics of these 
regimes fueled both the contem po­
rary economic crisis and a wide­
spread and well-documented 
climate o f grave hum an rights 
abuse. In 1982, however, the presi­
dency of General Romeo Lucas 
Garcia was overthrown in a military 
coup, and a process of democratic 
transition began. The question is 
why did some military circles de­
cide to gamble on an alternative, 
democratic path?
The reason, it seems, was the 
em ergence of an alternative to re­
pression as a strategy for defeating 
Guatemala’s insurgent movements. 
In the conservative view, achieving 
victory in counterinsurgency war­
fare justified systematic military 
reprisals against the general popu­
lation, particularly those suspected 
of providing sustenance, protec­
tion, and recruits to insurgent ar­
mies. A m ore sophisticated, liberal 
strain of this philosophy sought to 
make the approach m ore flexible 
and effective by recognizing the 
social-structural roots of insurgency 
and adding a new elem ent—psy-
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chological warfare—in an attem pt 
to win the “hearts and m inds” of 
the masses.
A second major step in 
the development of the 
theory of Guatemalan 
counterinsurgency 
warfare was the 
military’s realization 
that any society 
characterized by 
extreme poverty and 
inequality would be 
vulnerable to 
insurgency.
The modernization of counter­
insurgency strategy, however, did 
not end with the addition o f psy­
chological warfare. A nother major 
step in the developm ent of the 
theory, if not the practice, of Gua­
temalan counterinsurgency warfare 
was the military sector’s realization 
that any society characterized by ex­
trem e poverty and inequality would 
always be vulnerable to insurgency. 
In that light, a strategy of preven­
tion would be a far more valuable 
weapon in combating insurgency 
than psychological warfare, and 
the key to this “preventive” strategy 
would be to either satisfy the socio­
economic and political dem ands of 
the masses or to create the percep­
tion that such dem ands could be 
satisfied within the institutional 
channels of the status quo.
This updated version of counter­
insurgency doctrine was refined in 
both the Centro de Estudios Militares 
and the Estado Mayor (the executive 
body of the arm ed forces) in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s. It was 
subsequently galvanized by the 
strengthened military capacity of 
the country’s guerrilla forces— 
whose growing m om entum  was 
signified by their 1982 amalgama­
tion as the Union Revolutionaria 
National Guatemalteca (URNG)— 
and finally pu t into practice under 
the two transitional military govern­
ments that existed between the fall 
of Lucas Garcia and the formation 
of a constitutional government 
under Christian-Democrat Vinicio 
Cerezo. Based upon their new con­
ceptions, these interim  govern­
ments im plem ented a two-pronged 
policy. On the one hand, they 
launched all-out military offensives 
that—at a terrible cost in lives and 
damage to the social fabric, particu­
larly to indigenous communities in 
the countryside—devastated the in­
surgent support network and left 
the guerrillas in disarray. At the 
same time, they prepared for the 
free elections that culm inated in 
the Cerezo presidency by rebuild­
ing the party system and creating a 
constitutional assembly.
Political Consequences
The ultimate results, though, were 
no t exactly what the strategy’s ar­
chitects had expected. To begin 
with, the liberal wing of military 
leadership rem ained a minority, 
outnum bered by a conservative
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Adapted from El Periodico (Barcelona), March 28, 1992.
military caste whose members 
feared that democratization would 
present new political opportunities 
for the insurgents. A reflection of 
this divergence was the debate over 
ending the guerrilla war by means 
of a negotiated settlement. Presi­
dent Cerezo and the liberal wing of 
the arm ed forces supported this ap­
proach, suggesting an agreem ent 
within the framework of the August 
1987 Esquipulas II initiative for 
Central American peace and de­
mocratization. In contrast, the con­
servative wing not only opposed 
the approach but attem pted two 
coups against the Cerezo adminis­
tration.
Equally reflective of the political 
divergence between the military’s 
liberal and conservative wings is 
the persistence of hum an rights vio­
lations. It is well docum ented that, 
in spite of the country’s democrati­
cally elected presidencies, death 
squads encrusted within the 
governm ent’s national-security 
machinery and connected with re­
actionary sectors of civil society con­
tinue to commit serious and
widespread violations of hum an 
rights. In this respect, the US Em­
bassy, which has clearly supported 
the military modernizers, has 
sharply criticized Guatemala’s re­
cord of human-rights abuses, partic­
ularly with respect to the m urders 
of US activists Mirna Mack, Mi­
chael Devine, and Dianna Mae 
Ortiz.
The split within the executive 
ranks of the arm ed forces leads to 
a key question concerning the 
long-range balance of civil-military 
relations: to what degree is the Gua­
temalan military willing to relin­
quish its traditional spheres of 
power? While the liberal wing is 
disposed to cede power in order to 
undercut the insurgent threat, the 
conservative wing is equally insis­
tent that it must maintain power in 
order to achieve the very same ob ­
jective.
In any case, the liberalization of 
the Guatemalan arm ed forces con­
tinues with the introduction of cur­
riculum reforms at various levels of 
training and education. Spearhead­
ing the reforms are the introduc­
tion of courses such as hum an 
rights, the incorporation of rela­
tively progressive civilian educators 
into military faculties, and the ini­
tiation of civil-military leadership 
forums to discuss questions of na­
tional security within the liberal­
ized framework. The latter have 
been linked to the Centro de Es- 
tudios de la Estabilidad Nacional 
through the past efforts o f a lead­
ing military modernizer, form er 
defense m inister General Hector 
Gramajo, as well as to current plan­
ning to establish the Escuela Supe­
rior de Estudios Estrategicos. It is 
through these reforms that the 
modernizers seek to eventually 
alter the military mentality.
The Future of Civil-Military 
Relations
Clearly the military’s liberal sector 
has been strong enough to initiate 
and defend Guatemala’s transition 
to democracy as well as the internal 
reform  of the arm ed forces. None­
theless, the future of both political 
democratization and military lib­
eralization is uncertain as long as 
the country’s internal war goes on. 
With this in mind, what has been 
the role of civilian political players? 
At first it was perhaps limited to 
whatever political space the mili­
tary was willing to cede. While Presi­
dent Cerezo initially attem pted to 
broaden this space, two attem pted 
coups forced him to take a defen­
sive posture. His successor, Jorge 
Serrano, who took office in 1990, 
made his objective the strengthen­
ing of his constitutional authority 
as head of the military. Though the 
political dom inance of the armed 
forces remains solidly intact, Se­
rrano has made substantial prog­
ress with respect to selecting high 
military officials and reducing the 
military’s invulnerability to charges 
of hum an rights violations.
The clearest evidence of grow­
ing civilian power, however, is that 
the military allowed Serrano to initi­
ate direct negotiations with URNG. 
As a result of these talks, which 
took place throughout 1990, a
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negotiated end to the internal war 
has become a distinct possibility. In­
sofar as they have strengthened the 
nexus between the governm ent’s 
civil machinery and the liberal sec­
tor o f the arm ed forces, these de­
velopments point to a long-term 
reorganization of Guatemalan civil- 
military relations. In this regard, it 
should be recognized that, as in 
the case of El Salvador, a successful 
conclusion to peace negotiations 
would be a definitive step toward 
demilitarization and the redefini­
tion of the military’s role. The lib­
eral sector of the arm ed forces 
seems to have accepted this possi­
bility.
Debate within the 
Guatemalan armed 
forces is beginning to 
converge with wider 
Latin American 
military trends by 
considering possible 
new roles.
vation. For example, the Guatema­
lan military’s small air and naval 
forces are already substantially in­
volved in the interception of drug 
traffic. Further, the military is de­
ploying its system of urban con­
trol—originally constructed for the
counterinsurgency campaign—to 
combat the widely recognized 
problem  of urban crime. And the 
military has acted to protect the 
Biosfera Maya, an immense park in 
the northern  province of Peten, 
against incursions by illegal tree- 
cutters from across the Mexican 
border.
The Guatemalan military con­
fronts a paradox: while political 
crisis has led to the institution’s 
growth, m odernization, and matu­
ration, Central America’s emerging 
regional order promises to de-em- 
phasize the role of military forces.
If this regional promise indeed crys­
tallizes, then democratic civil-mili­
tary relations could well become a 
Central American and Guatemalan 
reality. ■
(Translated by Hemisphere staff)
c c A
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sntral Am ericans’ efforts for human rights, 
jstice, and democracy by providing:
nerica Central America in Context
imunity groups; Slide Show presentations and forums on the historical roots
Social Studies, of current events with strategies for teaching Central Ameri-
rUal texts, histo- can students and for teaching North Americans about the
region. . .
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ings with Minis- The Books Project uses process-based writing strategies to
teachers’ union bring the voices of Central American refugee children into the
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Adapted fromYX Periodico (Barcelona), March 28, 1992.
tion of courses such as hum an 
rights, the incorporation of rela­
tively progressive civilian educators 
into military faculties, and the ini­
tiation of civil-military leadership 
forums to discuss questions of na­
tional security within the liberal­
ized framework. The latter have 
been linked to the Centro deEs- 
tudios de la Estabilidad Nacional 
through the past efforts of a lead­
ing military m odernizer, former 
defense minister General Hector 
Gramajo, as well as to current plan­
ning to establish the Escuela Supe­
rior de Estudios Estrategicos. It is 
through these reforms that the 
mnHprni7Pr»{ se e k  tn  p v e n tu a llv
military caste whose members 
feared that democratization would 
present new political opportunities 
for the insurgents. A reflection of 
this divergence was the debate over 
ending the guerrilla war by means 
of a negotiated settlement. Presi­
dent Cerezo and the liberal wing of 
the arm ed forces supported this ap­
proach, suggesting an agreem ent 
within the framework of the August 
1987 Esquipulas II initiative for 
Central American peace and de­
mocratization. In contrast, the con­
servative wing not only opposed 
the approach but attem pted two 
coups against the Cerezo adminis­
tration.
Equally reflective of the political 
divergence between the military’s 
liberal and conservative wings is 
the persistence of hum an rights vio­
lations. It is well docum ented that, 
in spite of the country’s democrati­
cally elected presidencies, death 
squads encrusted within the 
governm ent’s national-security 
machinery and connected with re­
actionary sectors of civil society con­
tinue to commit serious and
widespread violations of hum an 
rights. In this respect, the US Em­
bassy, which has clearly supported 
the military modernizers, has 
sharply criticized Guatemala’s re­
cord of human-rights abuses, partic­
ularly with respect to the m urders 
of US activists Mirna Mack, Mi­
chael Devine, and Dianna Mae 
Ortiz.
The split within the executive 
ranks of the arm ed forces leads to 
a key question concerning the 
long-range balance of civil-military 
relations: to what degree is the Gua­
temalan military willing to relin­
quish its traditional spheres of 
power? While the liberal wing is 
disposed to cede power in order to 
undercut the insurgent threat, the 
conservative wing is equally insis­
tent that it must maintain power in 
order to achieve the very same ob­
jective.
In any case, the liberalization of 
the Guatemalan arm ed forces con­
tinues with the introduction of cur­
riculum reforms at various levels of 
training and education. Spearhead­
ing the reforms are the introduc-
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negotiated end  to the internal war 
has become a distinct possibility. In­
sofar as they have strengthened the 
nexus between the governm ent’s 
civil machinery and the liberal sec­
tor of the arm ed forces, these de­
velopments point to a long-term 
reorganization of Guatemalan civil- 
military relations. In this regard, it 
should be recognized that, as in 
the case of El Salvador, a successful 
conclusion to peace negotiations 
would be a definitive step toward 
demilitarization and the redefini­
tion of the military’s role. The lib­
eral sector of the arm ed forces 
seems to have accepted this possi­
bility.
As a consequence, debate within 
the Guatemalan arm ed forces is be­
ginning to converge with wider 
Latin American military trends by 
considering possible new roles 
ranging from antidrug trafficking 
initiatives to environmental conser-
Debate zvithin the 
Guatemalan armed 
forces is beginning to 
converge with voider 
Latin American 
military trends by 
considering possible 
new roles.
vation. For example, the Guatema­
lan military’s small air and naval 
forces are already substantially in­
volved in the interception of drug 
traffic. Further, the military is de­
ploying its system of urban con­
trol—originally constructed for the
counterinsurgency campaign—to 
com bat the widely recognized 
problem  of urban crime. And the 
military has acted to protect the 
Biosfera Maya, an immense park in 
the northern  province of Peten, 
against incursions by illegal tree- 
cutters from across the Mexican 
border.
The Guatemalan military con­
fronts a paradox: while political 
crisis has led to the institution’s 
growth, m odernization, and matu­
ration, Central America’s emerging 
regional order promises to de-em- 
phasize the role of military forces.
If this regional promise indeed crys­
tallizes, then democratic civil-mili­
tary relations could well become a 
Central American and Guatemalan 
reality. ■
(Translated by Hem isphere staff)
N E C C A
N e t w o r k  o f  E d u c a t o r s ’ C o m m itte e s  o n  C e n t r a l  A m e r ic a  
supporting Central Am ericans’ efforts for human rights, 
social justice, and democracy by providing:
Resources on Central America
Tools for teaching K-12, college and community groups; 
useful for ESL, Language Arts, Spanish, Social Studies, 
Regional Studies; interactive lessons, bilingual texts, histo­
ries, poetry, prose . . .
Central American Tours
Including school visits, village stays; meetings with Minis­
ters of Education, U.S. Aid officials and teachers’ union 
leaders as well as exchange tours bringing Central American 
educators to the U.S. . . .
Central America in Context
Slide Show presentations and forums on the historical roots 
of current events with strategies for teaching Central Ameri­
can students and for teaching North Americans about the 
region. . .
Model Educational Programs
The Books Project uses process-based writing strategies to 
bring the voices of Central American refugee children into the 
classroom as they publish their own bilingual stories . . .
N ew  Titles! Caribbean C onnections, 6  Part Series!
For brochure, order forms, or information:
NECCA, Dept. H, 1118 22nd Street, NW Washington D.C. 20037 (202) 429-0137, FAX (202) 429-9766
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R E V I E W  
Baseball’s Caribbean Connection
by M artin F. Murphy
Sugarball: T h e  A m erican  G am e, 
th e  D om in ican  D ream
by Alan M. Klein. New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1991. 179pp. + x. 
$19.95. ’
El Beisbol: Travels th ro u g h  th e  
Pan-A m erican  Pastim e
by John Krich. New York: Prentice Hall,
1989. 272pp. + xv. Paperback. $8.95.
T h e  T ro p ic  o f  Baseball: Base­
ball in  th e  D om in ican  R epublic
by Rob Ruck. Westport, Conn.: Meckler, 
1991. 205pp. + xx. $37.50.
Barefoot boys playing base­ball with mitts fashioned from milk cartons, any round object serving as a ball and any long stick as a bat, with a sugar-cane 
plantation providing the backdrop. 
These images provide an irresis­
tible hum an interest angle for 
foreign journalists. Add multimil­
lionaire Dominican major leaguers 
and the story has the makings of a 
Horatio Alger tale—a seductive mo­
tif for North American audiences.
US newspapers and magazines 
serve up a kaleidoscope of these 
images throughout the year. Un­
fortunately most of these stories 
are the same. The same images, 
fallacies, and superficialities are re­
peated. Authors Alan Klein, John 
Krich, and Rob Ruck set the record
Martin F. Murphy is associate professor 
of anthropology and, a Fellow of the Kel­
logg Institute for International Studies, 
University of Notre Dame. His most re­
cent book is Dominican Sugar Planta­
tions: Production and Foreign 
Labor Integration (Praeger, 1991).
straight on the past and present re­
alities of Dominican baseball.
Baseball did not arrive in the 
Dominican Republic with the US 
occupation of 1916-24, as many be­
lieve. It came, rather, from Cuba in 
the 1880s. Though an import, it be­
came the Dominican game. But it 
was not until Jackie Robinson— 
am ong others—broke the “color 
barrier” in the 1950s that US major- 
league teams took an interest in re­
cruiting Dominican ballplayers.
Poor kids are told 
“you can make it, 
i f  you try, ’’and that 
“the streets of America 
really are lined 
with gold, at least 
for professional 
ballplayers. ”
Ninety percent of Dominicans fall 
into the category of black in US 
racial taxonomy, a group that sim­
ply was not perm itted to play with 
white major-league ballplayers un­
til Robinson came along. To be 
sure, Dominicans did play North 
Americans before then, bu t both 
their teammates and opponents 
were African-Americans from the 
Negro Leagues. With a few excep­
tions—by and large standouts such 
as Juan Marichal, the Alou broth­
ers, and the Carty brothers—Do­
minicans did not break into US 
major-league baseball until the
1970s. They now represent the larg­
est group of non-US born players.
Dominican sports folklore and 
sports pages maintain their own er­
roneous images. Poor kids are told 
“you can make it, if you try,” and 
that “the streets of America really 
are lined with gold, at least for pro­
fessional ballplayers.” Few kids un­
derstand that the vast majority of 
professional baseball players lan­
guish in the rookie and m inor 
leagues. Most of those fortunate 
and gifted enough to make it to 
the US earn an average gross salary 
of less than $10,000 a year and re­
ceive only $15 to $25 a day for ex­
penses while they are on the road. 
Instead of traveling in planes, they 
ride up to nine hours a day in re­
cycled passenger buses. And they 
play ball seven days a week to 
crowds that average less than 1,500 
in such out-of-the-way towns as 
Peoria and Utica.
In a conversation with a Do­
minican who played for a Chicago 
White Sox farm team, the player 
both lam ented and relished his 
present and future. Over his first 
home-cooked Dominican meal in 
eight months, he spoke about how 
he was getting old and had, at best, 
a few years left to make it out of 
the A league and into the majors; 
how when he needed a new m itt an 
agent would provide it, hoping he 
would someday sign a lucrative con­
tract. He related to me the social 
pressures he encounters when he 
returns to his community in the 
Cibao, the fertile valley in the cen­
ter of the island of Hispaniola. 
Family, friends, neighbors, and 
hangers-on all assume that he 
makes millions of dollars like 
Pedro Guerrero of the St. Louis 
Cardinals. W hen he doesn’t share 
his “wealth,” they say he is selfish
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and tacano (cheap). In the midst of 
the laments, he affirmed he would 
make it to the real White Sox team. 
He just needed to work hard, not 
be a “head case,” and “if God was 
willing” he would someday play in 
Chicago’s new Comiskey Park.
Dreams do not die easily, even 
with heavy doses of reality. Most 
poor and working-class boys not 
only fantasize about being in the 
big leagues, but know someone 
who “was signed” by a major-league 
organization. Their friends or rela­
tives seldom made it past the re­
cruits’ academies in the Dominican 
Republic or the rookie league in 
Florida. Nonetheless, as a re­
m inder that some do “get called 
up ,” even the biggest superstars— 
like Pedro G uerrero, George 
(“Jorge”) Bell, Tony Fernandez, 
and Julio Franco—spend the win­
ter at home. Indeed, the guys to 
whom the gringos pay millions of 
dollars a year are never very far 
away—a lesson I learned to my 
embarrassment.
As I was riding a bus from the 
capital city of Santo Domingo to 
San Pedro de Macoris in 1983, my 
seat mate struck up a conversation. 
He looked like most o ther 20-year- 
old m en from San Pedro. He was 
even wearing a Philadelphia Phil­
lies T-shirt, as did many young Do­
minican m en that winter, m onths 
after the team had won the Na­
tional League pennant. He told me 
that he played for the Phillies or­
ganization; but I was no t to be 
duped. I was certain that the man 
had confused fantasy with reality; 
there was nothing special about 
him. Nine m onths later, however, 
his picture appeared on the front 
page of the sports section of the 
Listin Diario. Not only was he in­
deed a ballplayer in the Phillies
organization, but he had made it 
to the “bigs” in grand style: Juan 
Samuel was voted 1984 National 
League Rookie of the Year by the 
Sporting News.
Most poor and 
working-class boys 
not only fantasize 
about being in 
the big leagues, but 
know someone who 
“was signed” by 
a major-league 
organization.
Sports and the Study ot Society
Using a variety of disciplinary and 
theoretical approaches, scholars 
have dem onstrated that sport is a 
valid area of social inquiry and that 
the study of sport can inform us 
about society and culture. But they 
have set a difficult task for them ­
selves. They must face two oppos­
ing camps. Many in the snobbish 
US intellectual community like to 
think of themselves as somehow 
above the study of games. O n the 
o ther hand, many sports fans want 
to see sport on its own terms, not 
clouded with social analysis and 
commentary.
In this setting, Klein’s Sugarball 
and Ruck’s Tropic of Baseball at­
tem pt to walk the fine line between 
baseball lovers and more rigorous 
scholars. The two books amply 
dem onstrate that the study of 
sport, in this case, baseball, can be
intimately tied to the study of soci­
ety and culture, especially the study 
of a particular society and culture.
Klein’s anthropological study is 
organized around the them e of the 
dialectic between hegemony and re­
sistance. Hegemony, he argues, is 
expressed in the control that US 
culture (in the form of baseball) 
and capitalism (in the form of 
major-league organizations) exert 
over Dominican sport and society 
in general. Resistance, he claims, is 
evidenced by the national hero wor­
ship of Dominican ballplayers who 
have long dom inated the big 
leagues—Juan Marichal striking 
out gringos, Pedro Guerrero or 
George (“Jorge”) Bell blasting a 
hom e run off America’s best pitch­
ers. Every hit, every strike pitch, 
every heroic catch by a Dominican 
is a source of national pride.
The model is compelling, but 
Klein’s treatm ent of it is often 
forced, and a num ber of his state­
ments about the Dominican Repub­
lic are simply erroneous. The most 
striking of these—that the country 
exhibits the lowest per capita in­
come in the Western Hemisphere 
(p. 9)—ignores, am ong other coun­
tries, the Dominican Republic’s 
closest neighbor: Haiti. Klein is at 
his best when describing how Do­
minican players and fans behave in 
the stadium and discussing the 
young recruits—the “W annabees.” 
These chapters provide ethno­
graphic insights, but are unfortu­
nately tainted by the au tho r’s 
preoccupation with differences 
between Dominicans and North 
Americans. Klein seems unable to 
in terpret Dominican culture with­
out constant reference to his own.
Rob Ruck is an historian by 
vocation and a lover of baseball 
and good literary style by nature.
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Unlike Klein’s Sugarball, whose pri­
mary mission is to test scholarly 
hypotheses through the study of 
baseball, Ruck’s Tropic of Baseball is 
unabashedly about the game itself. 
His book, then, is written for fans. 
As a scholarly work, however, it sub­
tly teaches the history of Domini­
can society and culture to an 
audience of North American base­
ball fans. Indeed, his description 
and analysis of the developm ent of 
baseball in the Dominican Repub­
lic is the definitive treatm ent of the 
topic.
In ElBeisbol, journalist John 
Krich employs a grander view than 
that of Klein or Ruck; he discusses 
five principal suppliers of major- 
league ballplayers (the Dominican 
Republic, Mexico, Nicaragua, 
Puerto Rico, and Venezuela). He 
also approaches Hispanic Carib­
bean baseball with no academic 
pretensions and tells his story with 
the wacky and whimsical flair of a 
H unter Thompson. Krich’s ap­
proach makes for fascinating read­
ing—an adventure in the tropics, 
with baseball and the history of US 
dom inance over Latin America as 
the unifying themes. In short,
Krich has written a book for politi­
cally progressive US baseball fans. 
No fan can finish this book without 
appreciating the social and politi­
cal problems of Caribbean Basin 
nations and the inequities in US- 
Latin American relations. W hether 
discussing Mexican, Venezuelan, 
or Dominican baseball, Krich has 
the unique talent of combining 
tales of individual passion with 
broad historical events. Sexual liai­
sons exist side-by-side with racial 
confrontations. Salsa rhythms and 
fried plantains inhabit the same 
canvas with dictatorships and US 
military occupations.
Krich’s wildest political fantasies 
are found in his last chapter, “The 
Reconquest.” Latin ballplayers con­
quer US baseball and society as 
leftist guerrillas: “. . . all the Latin 
leaguers simultaneously put down 
their mitts and pick up machetes. 
The banana republics become base­
ball republics once and for all. And
that’s when the hot pot that’s been 
cooking for a century boils over” 
(pp. 269-70). Roberto Clemente re­
turns to lead the troops, Juan Mari- 
chal’s tradem ark “high kick proves 
useful in evading the barbed wire 
on army bases” (p. 270), US gov­
ernors and senators are replaced 
by umpires, games are played in 
“Anti-Yankee Stadium,” and “the 
White House becomes the Tan 
House” (p. 271).
As quickly as 
Dominicans emerged 
as solid and even 
superstar major-league 
players, professional 
baseball’s popularity 
in the country is 
declining even faster.
The Future of 
Dominican Baseball
Baseball is still a vital part of Do­
minican popular culture, but as 
both Klein and Ruck rem ind us, all 
is not well in the Dominican game. 
As quickly as Dominicans em erged 
in disproportionate num bers as 
solid and even superstar major- 
league players, professional base­
ball’s popularity in the country is 
declining even faster. The reasons 
are myriad and diverse. They are re­
lated to the declining quality of win­
ter ball in the Dominican Republic, 
economic crisis, and competition 
from another US-born sport.
Major-league ballplayers who 
toil for their millions of dollars dur­
ing the summer in the US are now 
reluctant to play during the Domin­
ican winter season. They argue that 
they need to rest and cannot risk 
a career-ending injury for a few 
pesos. Dominican fans grew ac­
customed to seeing some of the 
world’s greatest baseball players dis­
play their skills in their hom e coun­
try. Since the mid-1980s, however, 
few Dominican major leaguers play 
“winter ball” to audiences of their 
fellow countrymen, and those who 
do so tend to play a shortened 
season. Tony Pena, of the Boston 
Red Sox in the sum m er and the 
Aguilas Cibaenas (Cibao Eagles) in 
the winter, is the noteworthy excep­
tion and thus is now a national 
hero. Pena is not enough of an ex­
ception to save attendance, how­
ever. As Dominican fans have come 
to recognize the declining quality 
of winter baseball, the num ber of 
fans present in the stadium has 
plummeted.
A nother key reason for plung­
ing attendance is that the Domini­
can economy has been in shambles 
since 1984. The economic crisis 
has brought prolonged daily black­
outs that limit night games. More 
im portant, the lion’s share of 
Dominican fans comes from the 
working class, a group that can no 
longer afford the admission price.
Ruck also notes an im portant 
recent shift in sports interest in the 
country: basketball is beginning to 
supplant baseball as the Domini­
can national sport. Many Domini­
can youths now view baseball as the 
game of the older generation, of 
rural areas, and of the poor. Bas­
ketball is the new passion of the 
emerging urban lower-middle 
class. Michael Jordan m ania is on 
the rise in the Dominican Repub­
lic: Chicago Bulls T-shirts and high- 
top sneakers are now the youth 
fashion rage, and the new-style 
“wannabees,” “wanna be like Mike.”
So far, only one Dominican,
Tito Horford, has made it to the 
National Basketball Association 
(NBA) and his tenure was brief.
Will the second half of the 1990s 
bring an onslaught of Dominican 
roundball players to the NBA? 
Nonetheless, and regardless of the 
possible future success of Domini­
cans in the NBA, basketball in the 
Dominican Republic, like baseball, 
will always be a Dominican game. ■
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Order from your bookstore or direct 
from the publisher. Major credit cards 
accepted. Call: (908) 932-2280
Transaction Publishers 
Department 492LA5 
Rutgers University 
transaction New Brunswick, NJ 08903
THE TIGER AND THE CHILDREN
Fidel Castro and the Judgment of History 
Roberto Luque Escalona
Fidel Castro has long claimed that he would be absolved by history. 
This volume tests Castro’s claim against fact and finds that history will 
condemn the long-standing dictator of Cuba. Escalona’s work is filled 
with a level of intimate detail unrivaled in any other analysis.
ISBN: 1-56000-027-9 (cloth) 212pp. $29.95 
ISBN: 1-56000-593-9 (paper) 212pp. $14.95
POVERTY, NATURAL RESOURCES, 
AND PUBLIC POLICY IN CENTRAL AMERICA
U.S.-Third World Policy Perspective Series, No. 17 
Sheldon Annis, editor
Rural poverty and environmental degradation are steadily worsening 
in Central America,undercutting the prospects for regional peace and 
economic recovery.This volume analyzes strategies that aim to re­
duce poverty and protect the environment in the region.
ISBN: 1-56000-015-5 (cloth) 280pp. $24.95 
ISBN: 1-56000-577-7 (paper) 280pp. $15.95
REVOLUTIONARY STRATEGY
A Handbook for Practitioners
Ernesto Betancourt
Betancourt shows how to evaluate the politics and actions of leader­
ships in different revolutionary contexts (totalitarian, authoritarian, 
and democratic), using the Cuban and Uruguayan experiences as 
case studies.
ISBN: 0-88738-411-0 (cloth) 196pp. $29.95
ENVIRONMENT AND LABOR IN THE CARIBBEAN
Caribbean Perspectives, Volume 2
Joseph Lisowski, editor
This volume focuses on the eastern Caribbean, exploring aspects of 
management and climate; social, literary, and educational concerns; 
and includes an extended study of the labor situation in the U.S. 
Virgin Islands.
ISBN: 1-56000-584-X (paper) 128pp. $19.95
CUBA ANNUAL REPORT: 1989
Office of Research and Policy, Voice of America-Radio 
Marti Program
United States Information Agency
This annual statistical handbook provides fundamental data on Cuba, 
including in-depth reviews of Cuban foreign policy, the national econ­
omy, military allocations and manpower, political control, cultural 
developments, and ideological shifts.
ISBN: 1-56000-016-3 (cloth) 350pp. $59.95
transaction publishers
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P U B L I C A T
Civil-Military Relations in Latin America
by M arian Goslinga
T hroughout Latin America’s m odern history, militarism and authoritarianism  have been the norm , and democracy and reform  the exception. In the 1950s, for instance, 12 out of the 20 republics were ruled by militaryjuntas. Yet by 1961, 11 of the 12 had been eliminated. Only a year later, a new wave of military coups had begun as a result of which, by 1964, seven new militaryjuntas were in office. It has been estimated that, between independence and World War I, the Spanish-American republics experienced 115 successful mili­tary coups and many times that num ber of abortive military revolts (Edwin Lieuwen, Arms and Politics in Latin 
America, rev. ed., Praeger, 1961).
In the 1980s and early 1990s the military seemed to be on the retreat as country after country chose to experim ent 
with constitutionally elected government. Nonetheless, recent events in Haiti, Peru, and Venezuela appear to have 
swung the pendulum  the o ther way. At the least they have proven that the Latin American military remains a powerful 
wild card. Until Latin American democracy is able to shed its eggshell fragility, this vicious circle is apt to continue in­
definitely.
The literature listed below is one indicator of the durability of military influence on Latin American government 
and political affairs.
Una aproximacion al rol y a las ta- 
reas pendientes de las Fuerzas Ar­
madas en la transition paraguaya a 
la democracia. Ambal Regis Ro­
mero. Perspectiva International 
Paraguaya, v. 2 (January/June
1990), p. 95-116. [Analyzes the 
military’s role in Paraguay since 
the downfall of the Stroessner re­
gime in February 1989.]
Argentina y los nexos militares.
Leobardo U rrutia Juarez. Hispano 
Americano, v. 99 (August 1991), 
p. 39. [Describes the governm ent’s 
efforts to break up the money laun­
dering and drug trafficking begun 
under the military regime.]
Argentina’s “Dirty War”: An In­
tellectual Biography. Donald C. 
Hodges. Austin: University of Texas 
Press, 1991. 387 p. $37.50. [Exam­
ines the interaction between the 
arm ed forces, guerrillas, and or­
ganized labor since the 1930s, fo­
cusing on the 1970s and 1980s.]
Marian Goslinga is the Latin Ameri­
can and Caribbean librarian at Florida 
International University.
Argentina, el ejercito que tenemos.
Jorge Grecco, Gustavo Gonzalez. Bue­
nos Aires: Editorial Sudamericana,
1990. 220 p. [An institutional por­
trait of A rgentina’s arm ed forces 
based on interviews with their lead­
ers and other members of the de­
fense community.]
Between Confrontation and Ac­
commodation: Military and Gov­
ernment Policy in Democratic 
Argentina. David Pion-Berlin. /owr- 
nal of Latin American Studies, v. 23 
(October 1991), p. 543-71. [Dis­
cusses civil-military relations in Ar­
gentina and the policies of Raul 
Alfonsin during 1983-89.]
Beyond Elections. Tina Rosenberg. 
Foreign Policy, no. 84 (Fall 1991), 
p. 72-91. [Discusses the military’s 
role in Latin America in general.]
De Geisel a Collor: o balan^o da 
transigao. Bolivar Lamounier. Sao 
Paulo: Sumare, 1990. 197 p. [Dis­
cusses the transition from military 
government to civilian rule in Bra­
zil during 1974-89.]
Democracy vs. National Security: 
Civil-Military Relations in Latin
America. Paul W. Zagorski. Boulder, 
Colo.: L. Rienner Publishers, 1992. 
217 p. $35.00; $16.95 paper. [Ana­
lyzes the problem  of establishing 
civilian control over the armed 
forces in the Latin American de­
mocracies.]
El Salvador: The Military and Poli­
tics. Martin C. Needier. Armed 
Forces and Society, v. 17 (Summer 
1991), p. 569-88.
En nombre de Dios. Raul Marin.
Pensamiento Propio, v. 9, no. 7 (Janu- 
ary-February 1991), p. 20-21. [Ex­
amines Guatemalan president 
Jorge Serrano Elias’s promise to 
bring the arm ed forces under civil­
ian rule.]
Explaining the Long-Term Main­
tenance o f a Military Regime: 
Panama Before the U.S. Invasion.
Steve C. Ropp. World Politics, v. 44 
(January 1992), p. 210-34.
From Military to Civilian Rule.
Constantine P. Danopoulos. London: 
Routledge, 1992. 256 p. $79.95. 
[Examines civil-military relations in 
South America, Central America, 
and the Dominican Republic.]
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Las fuerzas armadas y la transition 
a la democracia en America Latina.
Gustavo Cuevas Farren. Politico, 
nos. 22/23 (June 1991), p. 83-99. 
[Discusses the military’s attitudes 
towards the democratization pro­
cesses in Argentina, Brazil, and 
Uruguay.]
Gewerkschaften und Militarre- 
gierung in Peru. Achim Wachendorf. 
Heidelberg: H eidelberger Ver- 
laganstalt, 1989. 553 p. [Discusses 
relations between labor unions and 
the military in Peru, 1968-80.]
Honduras. Jennifer Rosenberg. 
Mesoamerica, v. 10, no. 11 (Novem­
ber 1991), p. 9-10. [Reviews the 
growing controversy over the 
military’s role in the country.]
Is Democracy Possible in Haiti?
Ernest H. Preeg. North-South, v. 1, 
no. 1 (June 1991), p. 34-39. [Dis­
cusses H aiti’s political situation 
after the February 7, 1991, election 
of Jean-Bertrand Aristide and ques­
tions the stability o f Haitian democ­
racy.]
Militarism and Politics in Latin 
America: Peru from Sanchez Cerro 
to Sendero Luminoso. Daniel M. 
Masterson. New York: Greenwood 
Press, 1991. 345 p. [Analyzes Peru’s 
political situation during 1930-68 
with emphasis on the role of the 
arm ed forces.]
The Military and the Politics of 
Change in Guyana. Ivelav L. Grif­
fith. Journal of Interamerican Studies 
and World Affairs, v. 33 (Summer 
1991), p. 141-73. [Discusses devel­
opments since independence with 
emphasis on the 1980s.]
Military Bureaucracy, Political Op­
position, and Democratic Transi­
tion. Alex E. Fernandez Jilberto; 
Anfbal Yariez, trans. Latin American 
Perspectives, v. 18 (Winter 1991), 
p. 33-65. [Discusses Chile’s political 
scenario after Allende’s defeat.]
The Military in Latin America: Is 
the Retreat for Good? Fernando 
Bustamante. Bulletin of Peace Pro­
posals, v. 21 (December 1990), 
p. 371-84. [Presents the possibility 
of a reversal in the pervasive trend 
towards military coups and repres­
sive militaryjuntas of the 1970s.]
The Military Regime and the Re­
structuring o f Land Tenure. Patri­
cio Silva; Nancy Plankey Videla, 
trans. Latin American Perspectives, 
v. 18 (Winter 1991), p. 15-32. [Fo­
cuses on Chile’s Pinochet dictator­
ship.]
;Mision cumplida?: Civil-Military 
Relations and the Chilean Political 
Transition. Brian Loveman.Journal 
of Interamerican Studies and World Af­
fairs, v. 33, no. 3 (Fall 1991), p. 35- 
74. [Reviews the constitutional 
framework that has em erged since 
1973 and examines the tensions fol­
lowing the installation of a civilian 
government in 1990.]
Mobilization at the Grassroots: 
Shantytowns and Resistance in Au­
thoritarian Chile. Cathy Schneider.
Latin American Perspectives, v. 18 
(Winter 1991), p. 92-112. [De­
scribes the opposition in the “po- 
blaciones" to the military regime.]
A Nation o f Enemies: Chile under 
Pinochet. Pamela Constable, Arturo 
Valenzuela. New York: Norton,
1991. 367 p. [Describes political 
and social developments, focusing
on the attitudes and interests of var­
ious social groups.]
The Next Steps in Central Amer­
ica. Bruce L. R. Smith, ed. Washing­
ton: Brookings Institution, 1991.
87 p. $9.95. [Paper presented at a 
conference held in Washington, 
DC, June 19-21, 1990; discusses po­
litical, economic, and military is­
sues.]
Nicaragua’s Permanent Crisis: Rul­
ing from Above and Below. Mark 
A. Uhlig. Survival, v. 33 (Septem­
ber/O cto b er 1991), p. 401-23. 
[Discusses the relations between 
Violeta C ham orro’s government 
and the Frente Sandinista military 
forces.]
Uma nova concepcao estrategica 
para o Brasil: um debate necessa- 
rio. Armando A. F. Vidigal. Politica 
eEstrategia, v. 7, no. 3 (July-Septem- 
ber 1991), p. 304-24. [Focuses on 
Brazil’s military strategy within the 
context of a new international su­
perpower structure.]
Of Victims and Executioners: Ar­
gentine State Terror, 1975-1979.
David Pion-Berlin, George A.
Lopez. International Studies Quar­
terly, v. 35 (March 1991), p. 63-86. 
[Data from Argentina’s Comision 
Nacional sobre la Desaparicion de Per­
sonas (CONADEP).]
“Order and Progress”: A Political 
History o f Brazil. Ronald M. Schnei­
der. Westview Press, 1991. 486 p. 
$55.00. [Traces the course of repre­
sentative democracy in Brazil with 
emphasis on the military’s role.]
Organization o f American States 
Repudiates Suriname Military 
Coup. Luigi R. Einaudi. Foreign
Hemisphere • Summer 1992
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Policy Bulletin, v. 1 (January/April 
1991), p. 136-37. [Includes the 
statem ent of the OAS Perm anent 
Council of December 28, 1990, as 
well as the text of Resolution 554.]
Panama. Steve Levitsky. Meso- 
america, v. 10, no. 7 (July 1991), 
p. 11-12. [Summarizes the plan to 
abolish the military.]
Politics and Identity in the Argen­
tine Army: Cleavages and the Gen­
erational Factor. Silvio Waisbord.
Latin American Research Review, 
v. 26, no. 2 (Spring 1991), p. 157- 
64. [Discusses the military’s chang­
ing role in democratic Argentina.]
The Popular Sector Response to an 
Authoritarian Regime: Shantytown 
Organizations since the Military 
Coup. Philip Oxhorn. Latin Ameri­
can Perspectives, v. 18 (Winter 1991), 
p. 66-91. [A new look at civil-mili- 
tary relations in Chile.]
Presidential Elections and Political 
Transition in Latin America. Hel-
gio Trindale. International Social 
Science Journal, v. 43 (May 1991), 
p. 301-14.
El proceso de dialogo-negociacion 
durante el primer ano de ARENA 
[Alianza Republicana Nacionalis- 
ta]. Carlos Lozada. Estudios Cen- 
troamericanos (ECA), v. 45, nos. 
500-501 (June-July 1991), p. 439-63. 
[Describes ARENA’S first year in 
power and its relations with the 
Salvadoran armed forces.]
Reconceptualizing Latin American 
Authoritarianism in the 1970’s: 
From Bureaucratic-Authoritarian- 
ism to Neoconservatism. Hector E. 
Schamis. Comparative Politics, v. 23 
(January 1991), p. 201-20.
The Root o f All Evil. A. Cockburn, 
R. McKerrow. New Statesman Society, 
v. 4 (March 15, 1991), p. 22-23.
Seguridad y democracia: el debate 
sobre la defensa comun del he- 
misferio recien comienza. Ana
Baron. Somos,v. 14, no. 772 (July
15, 1991), p. 57. [Discusses the de­
fense of democracy in the event of 
a new tide of military coups in 
Latin America.]
Sin novedad en el frente. Grace 
Gibson. QuePasa, no. 1063 (August 
1991), p. 12-13. [Discusses the im­
proving relations between the mili­
tary and the government in Chile.]
Social Action and Development:
The Case of Brazil. C. A. Medina.
Community Development Journal, 
v. 26, no. 3 (July 1991), p. 172-77. 
[Traces the demise of military dicta­
torships in Latin America during 
the 1980s with special reference to 
the growth of social movements in 
Brazil.]
The Struggle for Democracy in 
Chile, 1982-1990. Paul W. Drake,
IvanJaksic, eds. Lincoln: University 
of Nebraska Press, 1991. 321 p.
La transition chilena: un corte de 
caja. Manuel A. Garreton. Nexos,
v. 14, no. 159 (March 1991), p. 45- 
50. [Discusses the challenges facing 
the Aylwin government as it moves 
towards consolidating democracy 
in Chile.]
The Unfinished Republic: Brazil.
Jose Murillo de Carvalho. Americas, 
v. 48, no. 2 (October 1991), p. 139- 
42. [Discusses the civil-military rela­
tions under Deodoro de Fonseca.]
Which Path to Peace: Reorienting 
Central America’s Armed Forces.
Michael Dewar. International Defense 
Review, v. 24, no. 7 (July 1991), 
p. 706-7. [Describes the changing 
focus of the armed forces in Nicara­
gua, Guatemala, El Salvador, and 
Honduras.]
Whither the Latin American Mili­
tary? Gabriel Marcella. North-South, 
v. 1, no. 2 (August-September
1991), p. 34-37. [Discusses the chal­
lenge facing Latin America of inte­
grating the military into society 
and asserting civilian control.]
C------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ \
The C hanging  
H em ispheric 
Trade E nvironm ent:
O pportunities and  
O bstacles
Mark B. Rosenberg, Editor
Leading international trade specialists analyze options for hemispheric 
trade, including the likely impact of a North American free trade 
agreement and a single European market and the roles of Japan and the 
Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
Contributors: Luis Abugattas, Myles Frechette, Marian Goslinga, Wolf 
Grabendorff, Gary C. Hufbauer, Tetsuro lino, Carolyn Lamm, Henry Nau, 
Riordan Roett, Mark B. Rosenberg, Jeffrey J. Schott, Barbara Stallings.
September 1991. 165 pp. 6 x 9.
ISBN 1-879862-01-8 Paperback, $11.95 (S/H, add $1.25 per book).
Order direct from: Latin American and Caribbean Center (LACC),
Florida International University, University Park, Miami, Florida 33199.
Visa and MasterCard orders: (305) 348-2894 or fax (305) 348-3593.
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